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American Consulate General
Hong Kong, B.C.C.

No. 801
December 16, 1974

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Unless otherwise indicated, these materials are full translations of articles appearing in People's Republic of China periodicals.

Han Hsin - a Critique

by

Shih Ting (施丁)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an [Study and Criticism], No. 11, November 20, 1974)

During the struggle between the two lines of the Legalist and Confucian schools, that is, between unification and division, between counter-restoration and restoration and between progress and regression, in the early Han dynasty, Han Hsin courted the tragic end of self-destruction by pushing the Confucian line of division and regression. Today, to make a criticism of Han Hsin from the viewpoint of historical materialism will help us further identify the reactionary role of the Confucian school in history.

I

After the large-scale peasant uprisings in late Ch'in toppled the Ch'in dynasty, Hsiang Yü, who came from the old aristocracy in the state of Ch'u, hoisted the tattered banner of "reviving states that have become extinct and restoring families whose line of succession has been broken." In February, 206 B.C., he set up 18 vassal states and called himself Ch'u Pa Wang (the Chief Lord of Ch'u), thereby dismembering the country once unified by Ch'in Shih Huang. It was under these circumstances that Liu Pang in August of the same year, hoisting the anti-Ch'u big banner, led the Han troops to wage a war aimed at reunifying the country. This was a struggle between the two lines of the Legalist and Confucian schools. In this struggle, Han Hsin filled the role as chief representative of the Confucian line of division and regression within the Han army.

After unleashing and leading the war against Ch'u and in the course of the war, Liu Pang turned the newly acquired land into prefectures and counties, reinstituting the system of prefectures and counties enforced by the Ch'in dynasty. Han Hsin, however, went the other way; he was keen on playing the game of making himself a hegemonic lord. In 205 B.C., on Liu Pang's order, he opened the battlefield in the north and, with the support of such generals as Kuan Ying and Ts'ao Ts'an, defeated King Pao of Wei. Subsequently, Liu Pang sent a reinforcement of 30,000 men led by Chang Erh enabling Han Hsin to continue the fighting and defeat the armies under Hsia Shuo and Ch'en Yü and take over the land of T'ai and Chao. In 204 B.C., on his own authority Han Hsin established Chang Erh, a restorationist of the slave system, as King of Chao. A reactionary Confucian scholar, Chang Erh had infiltrated the insurgent ranks of Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang, carried out divisive and secessionist activities on a large scale, and gravely threatened the cause of the peasant revolution. At this time, in making himself King of Chao in collaboration with Han Hsin, he had in mind the aim of continuing to implement the Confucian line of division and regression. Catching them by surprise, Liu Pang seized their seals and called a conference of generals to carry out reorganization and consolidation. This

struggle could be said to be a prelude to the struggle between Liu Pang and Han Hsin, a struggle between the Confucian and Legalist lines.

At that time, while directing the Han troops to engage the Ch'u troops on the frontal battlefield, Liu Pang dispatched Sui Ho as his envoy to win over Ying Pu who had reached Huainan so as to enable Han Hsin, who was fighting in Wei and Chao, to make a two-prouged attack on the Ch'u troops from the south and north. He also instructed P'eng Yüeh to carry out harrassment against the rear of Ch'u. In addition, he sent Li Yi-chi to the state of Ch'i to talk King T'ien Kuang of Ch'i into surrendering to Han so as to complete the encirclement against the Ch'u army from the northeast. On hearing of the success of Li Yi-chi in persuading Ch'i to surrender to Han, Han Hsin, becoming ambitious, took the advice of Kuai T'ung, a Confucianist, and perfidiously took his troops to attack Ch'i which had already surrendered to Han in order to seize the land for himself. As a result, Li Yi-chi was executed by the King of Ch'i by being boiled in a frying pan. In 203 B.C., having occupied the land of Ch'i, Han Hsin immediately blackmailed Liu Pang and "wants to make himself king!" ("Han Hsin, Marquis of Huaiyin" in Historical Records. Following quotations from this article will not be denoted separately) At that time, the war between Han and Ch'u was entering its fourth year of fierce fighting, and Liu Pang was resisting Hsiang Yü at the Yinyang front under extremely difficult conditions. However, Han Hsin was claiming to be a king in the land he occupied, thus making clear his sinister motive.

When Han Hsin was setting up his mountain stronghold and travelling down an evil road, some reactionary conservative elements tried all possible means to instigate and woo him, asking him to go a step further and establish an independent kingdom. At this time Hsiang Yü dispatched his counsellor Wu She to talk to Han Hsin. When Wu She saw Han Hsin, he preposterously described Hsiang Yü's policy of "dividing the land and appointing separate rulers" as a peaceful enterprise aimed to "bring rest to the soldiers" while slanderously accusing Liu Pang's unification cause of "encroaching on others' share and seizing others' land." His aim was to make Han Hsin "turn against Han and make peace with Ch'u," so "the world may be divided into three." As for the reactionary Confucian scholar Kuai T'ung, he again and again instigated Han Hsin, attacking the Han troops led by Liu Pang as "wanting both in intelligence and bravery." "Their grain stocks are being depleted and the common people are being impoverished and turned into destitutes." At the same time, he praised Han Hsin as "an unsurpassed strategist," "enjoying the highest reputation in the world," thereby making this big warlord highly intoxicated. Finally, he instigated Han Hsin to break with Liu Pang and, hoisting the splittist banner of "dividing the world into three and holding one share," become an uncrowned king with a "mighty army" and "in possession of the strong Ch'i."

Han Hsin had mixed feelings at this time. On the one hand, he expressed his loyalty to Liu Pang and his "willingness to die" for him. Pretentiously he said, "His Highness has held me in deep trust, and I believe betrayal to be an evil." He said that he would never "become a traitor for private gains." On the other hand, with an axe to grind, he occupied a mountain stronghold and ruled as king, thereby becoming Liu

Pang's strange bed-fellow. The reason why he did not openly "revolt against Han" at this time was that the war between Han and Ch'u had yet to be decided, that he had yet to establish his foothold firmly, and that therefore it was premature to break with Liu Pang. Yet he guarded himself with a strong army and "takes credit for many military feats." Since Liu Pang could not do anything to him, he could preserve his independent kingdom.

The lust for power of a careerist can never be satisfied. Following the expansion of his own strength, Han Hsin's lust for power grew larger and larger, revealing his real features with every day that passed. Having defeated Hsiang Yü in the frontal war between Han and Ch'u, Liu Pang in October 202 B.C. pressed ahead with victory and asked Han Hsin to bring his troops to join him so as to wipe out the Ch'u army lock, stock and barrel. At this crucial moment, Han Hsin and P'eng Yüeh, another careerist, refused to carry out orders but sat on the mountain to watch tigers fight. This caused the Han army to suffer losses at one time and delayed the progress of the war between Han and Ch'u. Blinded by a desire for gain and growing ever more ambitious, they wanted to have "the land of Ch'u" and to make themselves "kings." ("Pao of Wei and P'eng Yüeh" in Historical Records) They asked Liu Pang to concede to their demand before joining forces to attack Ch'u. While Liu Pang was bent on destroying Hsiang Yü and the Ch'u army, Han Hsin wanted to preserve his reactionary forces. Liu Pang wanted to unify the command, but Han Hsin turned a deaf ear to orders. Thus, Liu Pang's military line of "disciplining the army according to law" was set against Han Hsin's military line of "disciplining the army according to propriety." At that time, however, setting great store by the general situation, Liu Pang put up with Han Hsin's and P'eng Yüeh's unreasonable demands and enabled the war between Han and Ch'u to end with victory for the former and defeat for the latter. Taking the situation as a whole, the victory was won because Liu Pang firmly carried out the Legalist line of unification and went along with the tides of history and not because he depended on the careerist Han Hsin.

Some Confucianists went all out to extol Han Hsin as "the top soldier." (Lu Chi, "In Praise of Officials Who Performed Meritorious Services to Emperor Kaotsu of Han," Selected Works, Vol. VII) They said that "it was largely because of Han Hsin that Han gained control of the world." ("The Eleven Years of Emperor Kaotsu of Han, Tzu Chih T'ung Chien") It seemed that the victory of Han and the defeat of Ch'u as well as the unification in early Han were all due to this great hero, Han Hsin. This completely reverses history. The appearance of the unified phase in early Han was made possible by the progressive role of the revolutionary struggle waged by the masses of the people against Hsiang Yü's restoration at that time, by Liu Pang's adoption of the Legalist line calling for unification and advance. If all the credits were ascribed to Han Hsin, this actually was to sing the praises of and affirm the Confucian line of division and regression, an out-and-out idealist conception of history.

II

When the war between Han and Ch'u had just ended, Liu Pang, while returning home with his army, drove into Han Hsin's barracks, "seized his army," and "vested the power of expedition in the hands of one king." ("Emperor Kao of Han," Tzu Chih T'ung Chien, Vol. II) By depriving Han Hsin of his military power when the war between Han and Ch'u had ended, Liu Pang made an important decision on the question of military leadership. This was a vital measure for strengthening the centralization of power under the feudal system and developing the cause of unification, thus preparing one important condition for putting down the rebellions of the feudal princes who practiced division and secession. Without this measure it would have been impossible to further consolidate and develop the feudal cause of unification in early Han.

But though deprived of military power, Han Hsin refused to take defeat lying down. As king of Ch'u in the possession of a large piece of land, he still had certain military forces. Being the "strongest" among the feudal princes in early Han, he was "the first to rebel." (Chia I, "Strong Princes," New Books, Vol. I) When he arrived at the land of Ch'u, he "surrounded himself with troops" and acted arrogantly. Moreover, he privately retained and shielded the reactionary element Chung Li-mei among others. Chung Li-mei had worked for Hsiang Yü's restoration cause during the war between Han and Ch'u, and was an important prisoner of war taken by the Han army. Hating Chung to the marrow of his bone, Liu Pang ordered Han Hsin to have him arrested. Han Hsin ignored the order, his reactionary arrogance soaring to a new high. Filled with righteous indignation, the generals of the Han royal court advised Liu Pang to take action immediately. In early 201 B.C., Liu Pang, adopting Ch'en P'ing's plan and with the support of Fan Kuai and other generals, led a big army to a place called Ch'en in the western border of Ch'u. These sudden and sweeping operations caused Chung Li-mei to commit suicide, and Han Hsin grudgingly became Liu Pang's prisoner. Liu Pang brought Han Hsin back to Loyang, forgave his crime and only demoted him to be the marquis of Huaiyin. Yet, without the slighest intention to repent, Han Hsin, a reactionary element, "complained day and night." He wildly declared in front of Liu Pang: "You have only led a hundred thousand troops." "I can lead many more, the more the better." These words spoke for his conceit and arrogance. Laughing, Liu Pang asked him: "The more the better, yes. But why were you captured by me?" Han Hsin, embarrassed, replied: "Although you are incapable of leading troops, you are good at using generals. That is why I was captured by you." He added: "Moreover, Your Majesty was entrusted with the Heavenly mandate, about which no man can do anything." Thus, against his original intention, he praised Liu Pang to his face, even citing the deceptive "mandate of Heaven." Actually, a little smile on his lips, he was sharpening his knife secretly, waiting for an opportunity to strike.

The second year (200 B.C.) after he was demoted, Han Hsin collaborated with another careerist Ch'en Hsi and worked out a secret plan with him to stage a coup d'etat. Banking on his high office and title (marquis

of Yanghsia and prime minister of Chao) and his possession of military power (he controlled the border troops), Ch'en Hsi formed a gang for private ends and ran amuck defying the law. All reactionary elements who carried out restoration activities established ties with the social scum, and Ch'en Hsi and Han Hsin were no exception. Stepping into the shoes of such old aristocrats as Lord Hsinling in the Warring States period, Ch'en Hsi recruited social scum everywhere, with "more than a thousand carriages of guests arriving at his gate," and did a lot of "illegal deeds." ("Han Hsin and Lu Wan" in Historical Records) At the same time, he also collaborated with the King of Han, Hsin, who betrayed the Han royal court and surrendered to the slave-owning nobles of the Huns, and his generals Wang Huang, Man Ch'iu-ch'en and others. They "exchanged envoys" and disobeyed the orders of the Han royal court to come to it. After his reactionary activities were daily more revealed, he openly started a revolt in September 197 B.C., and "made himself King of T'ai after plundering and invading the land of Chao and T'ai." (Ibid.) He had under his control a vast region north of Hantan. Under this critical situation, Liu Pang, while keeping Empress Lü and Hsiao Ho in the capital Ch'angan, personally led his troops to put down the revolt. Hearing that Ch'en Hsi had started his revolt and thinking that the opportunity for restoration had arrived, Han Hsin did not follow Liu Pang on the expedition on the pretext of illness, while sending someone to see Ch'en Hsi secretly and conclude a reactionary alliance with him. On the one hand, consulting his family officials, he was prepared to forge an edict "freeing all public slaves" at night and launch a reactionary armed attack on the place where Empress Lü and the others under her stayed and strike it from within and without. "What a carefully prepared scheme, but it precisely cost your life." At the time when Han Hsin was working out his reactionary plan, Empress Lü and Hsiao Ho planned together and had Han Hsin arrested and executed.

Han Hsin deserved his death. But even when he died, he did not wake up. He still deceived the world by his lies. When he was caught by Empress Lü and was about to die, he said: "Too bad I did not take Kuai T'ung's advice! Now I have been tricked by a woman and a boy. This is surely fate." It seemed that Heaven had done him injustice. This was ghostly talk which deceived himself as well as others. Engels said: "To be sure, a man should be judged not by his statements but by his actions." Judging by Han Hsin's actions, people can only arrive at the conclusion that he should be beheaded. During the period of the Three Kingdoms, Ts'ao P'i, commenting on Han Hsin, said: "He said a lot of things but showed little sincerity in them. He disobeyed orders and his plot failed." (Ts'ao P'i's poem "Visit to the Magnificent City Loyang") This was quite an appropriate comment. After the conclusion of the war between Han and Ch'u and judging by the history of the struggle between the Confucian and Legalist lines, Liu Pang had indeed killed a number of people, but those that he killed were not meritorious officials who were loyal to the Legalist line that stood for national unification, but a handful of bad elements who practiced division and staged revolts. In strengthening centralized power and consolidating national unification, did he not execute a few careerists and conspirators such as Han Hsin, Ch'en Hsi and P'eng Yüeh? He did not do anything to harm the great majority of civil officials

and generals who adhered to the Legalist line and contributed to the feudal unification cause of Han--men like Hsiao Ho, Chang Liang, Fan Kuai, Ts'ao Ts'an, Kuan Ying, Ch'en P'ing and Chou Po. Instead, he gave them important positions. "In appointing only those who are worthy," Liu Pang followed the organizational line of the Legalist school.

Traditionally some Confucianists have written a great deal about the death of Han Hsin. They strongly denied that Han Hsin was guilty of rebellion. (Chu Hsi's "T'ung Chien Kang Mu" makes no mention of Han Hsin's revolt and execution. Using the so-called principle of "Spring and Autumn Annals," he wrote, "Han Hsin, the marquis of Huaiyin, was later killed, his family wiped out.") Instead, they kept on spreading some fallacies saying: "When the world was subdued, Han Hsin had not made the slightest mistake." (Chu I-tsun, "On Han Hsin," Pao Shu T'ing Chi Vol. LIX) Liu Pang was "jealous of his talent" and became "suspicious" of him. (Pan Ku, "Biographies of Han, P'eng, Ying, Lu and Wu," History of Han) Empress Lü, "harboring a sinister motive," "trumped up" the charge. They regretted that Han Hsin was killed "unjustly." (Liang Yü-sheng, "Doubts on Historical Records," Vol. XXXII) They said that this "pained their hearts." (Chao I, "Historical Note No. 4," Kai Yü Ts'ung K'ao, Vol. V) All these were absurd remarks aimed at reversing history, the groans of a fox who cried over the death of a rabbit. Han Hsin died because of his conspiracy and dug his own grave. This is a conclusion drawn by history. Playing the trick of "Tao hui" (concealment), Lin Piao owed his rise to scheming and also died because of it. No schemer has ever had a good end.

III

Han Hsin's crimes in promoting a split and regression had deep class and ideological roots.

Han Hsin was originally a rascal, obsessed with the desire to become a big official. At first, he was one of Hsiang Yü's bodyguards. Discontented with this small position, he went over to the Han army and offered his service to Liu Pang, who put him in charge of army provisions. Because he had not become a big general, he was dissatisfied and secretly deserted. Hsiao Ho ran after him and brought him back. When Liu Pang was preparing to unleash the war against Ch'u, he made Han Hsin a big general and asked him for advice. In reply, he said that Hsiang Yü made a big mistake in not rewarding those who served him well with cities and thus "lost the hearts of the people." He advised Liu Pang to "follow a different course." "If you reward those who have served you well with different cities, everyone will submit to you." That is to say, one could gain the world by conferring cities on those who had performed meritorious services. But the historical lesson of Hsiang Yü's defeat showed that the cause of his downfall was not that he had not conferred cities on those who had served him well but that he adopted the perverse course of restoring vassalage. It was not in accordance with facts that Han Hsin "spoke of Hsiang Yü's failings." He said this with the ulterior object of telling Liu Pang that: If I serve you well in the future, you must make me a king. Subsequently, when he took the land of Chao, he made Chang Erh the

King of Chao; when he seized the land of Ch'i, he made himself king. When he became the King of Ch'u, he tried to set up an independent kingdom. When his splittist and secessionist effort went bankrupt, he plotted to stage a coup d'etat and wanted to make himself the chief lord until his complete downfall.

Since the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, history had advanced in the direction of feudal unification. An important aspect of the struggle between the Confucian line that called for restoration and the Legalist line that stood for opposition to restoration was unfolded around the question of whether to defend and restore vassalage under the slave system or to set up and develop the prefectural system under the feudal system, namely, between division and regression on the one side and unification and centralization on the other. In the course of founding the Ch'in dynasty, abroad the old aristocrats of the six states unleashed a war against Ch'in, with the fugitive Ching K'o making his assassination attempt, in a bid to maintain the phase of division and secession and oppose unification. At home, Lü Pu-wei, Wang Wan, Ch'un Yü-yüeh and other representatives of the declining slave-owning class obstinately called for restoring vassalage and insisted on returning to the old. Ch'in Shih Huang, Li Ssu and other outstanding representatives of the newly rising landlord class waged an uncompromising struggle against the reactionary conservative forces and insisted on unification. After "swallowing and merging the six states," they "divided the world into 36 prefectures" and even went to the extent of suppressing their opponents with the measure of revolutionary violence in burning the books and burying the Confucianists alive. All this was aimed at firmly implementing the system of prefectures and counties and promoting reform and progress. In the last days of the Ch'in dynasty, Chao Kao, representative of the slave-owning restorationist forces, openly proposed the restoration of vassalage after usurping political power. Chang Erh, Ch'en Yü, K'ung Fu and other restorationists of the slave system and Confucianists vainly attempted to take advantage of the peasant revolution to promote restoration and practice division and secession. Ch'en Sheng, leader of the peasant revolution, firmly struggled against them and set up a revolutionary, unified regime instead of practicing vassalage. During the contention between Han and Ch'u, Hsiang Yü practiced vassalage and Liu Pang insisted on unification -- this was a continuation of the struggle between the Confucian and Legalist lines since the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Especially, during the 30-50 years from Ch'in Shih Huang ascending the throne to Hsiang Yü making himself Ch'u Pa Wang, from the contention between Han and Ch'u to the unification attained in early Han, storms arose continuously with governments succeeding each other, and one of the focal points of class struggle was on the question of whether to practice unification or division. Despite the fact that history runs a tortuous course and there are whirlpools in the torrents, the trend of unification has been irresistible, like the rolling huge waves that cannot be blocked. In the course of historical advance, Han Hsin wanted to make himself king and chief lord and practiced division and secession. Taking the stand of the declining slave-owning class, he pushed the Confucian reactionary line that advocated division and regression, in an attempt to roll back the wheel of history. Since historical advance

was an "irresistible trend," Han Hsin's tragic end also became a historical necessity. After making an analysis of Han Hsin's proposals to Liu Pang, Wang Fu-chih arrived at this conclusion: "Although Han Hsin became a big general under Liu Peng, he was ignorant of the trends of the time and, for this, he paid with his life." ("Emperor Kao of Han," Tu T'ung Chien Lun, Vol II) This is a relatively correct view.

In harboring Chung Li-mei and having "intimate private conversations" with Ch'en Hsi, Han Hsin was indeed very close to the reactionary elements. Yet he detested Chou Po, looked down upon Kuan Ying, and hated Fan Kuai; he was indeed extremely hostile to those who were loyal to the Legalist line. Once, Han Hsin came to Fan Kuai's house, and was cordially received by the latter. When he left, he said, laughing coldly: "Should I associate myself with people like Kuai?" What kind of person was Fan Kuai? He came from the lower stratum of society, "leading the life of a butcher." ("Biographies of Fan, Li, T'eng and Kuan" in Historical Records) During the time of the large-scale peasant uprisings in late Ch'in, he followed Liu Pang in an uprising and fought bravely. He was Liu Pang's old comrade-in-arms and a good general within the peasant army. After the peasant insurgent forces marched into Kuanchung, Liu Pang wanted to stay in the Ch'in palace, but Fan Kuai advised him to "return to Pashang in a hurry." When Hsiang Yü held a "Hungmen banquet" in an attempt to assassinate Liu Pang, Fan Kuai came forward bravely to denounce Hsiang Yü and covered Liu Pang's safe escape. In the early days of the war between Han and Ch'u, Liu Pang lost the battle in P'engch'eng. When many wavering elements were deserting Han for Ch'u and the Ch'u cavalrymen were launching an attack, Fan Kuai bravely led the newly formed cavalrymen in the Han army to rout the Ch'u cavalrymen in a place east of Yinyang, thereby "checking their advance further west." ("Hsiang Yü in Historical Records) Consistently placing himself under Liu Pang's command, he had won many battles during the war between Han and Ch'u. After the end of the war, he supported Liu Pang positively and joined in one battle after another in suppressing the feudal princes such as Ts'ang Tu, Han Hsin, King Hsin of Han, Ch'en Hsi and Lu Wan, who plotted revolts, thus performing new merit for the cause of unification by the Han dynasty. He also advised Liu Pang to take warning from Chao Kao's usurpation of power and his assassination of the Second Emperor of Ch'in. (See "Biographies of Fan, Li, T'eng and Kuan" in Historical Records) It is clear that Fan Kuai was a general who had made significant contributions to the feudal cause of unification at that time. Chou Po, Kuan Ying and other generals also fought with merit on the battlefield and firmly backed Liu Pang in carrying out the Legalist line. The fact that Han Hsin was reluctant to be placed in the "same ranks" with such men as Fan Kuai, Chou Po and Kuan Ying and to "associate" himself with them and that he shared the dirt with men like Chung Li-mei and Ch'en Hsi shows, more than anything else, that this chieftain of the Confucialist line was a diehard bent on opposing the Legalist school. His erroneous organizational line was completely subordinate to his erroneous political line.

Historical facts prove that by placing his trust in the Confucianists and "disciplining the army according to propriety," Han Hsin wanted

nothing but division and regression. By worshipping the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and "disciplining the army according to propriety," Lin Piao wanted to do nothing but usurp power and restore the old order. Although they lived in different times, they were both guided by the reactionary Confucian ideology, resorted to conspiracies and intrigues, pushed a reactionary military line, and worked for the reactionary political line in a vain attempt to attain the criminal goal of restoring the old order and returning to the past. These negative facts have made us deeply aware that "we need not only a Marxist correct political line but also a correct Marxist military line." The army of our state must be guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought, and be commanded by Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. So, it is necessary to devastatingly criticize the Confucian reactionary military line in history and Lin Piao's bourgeois military line and to strengthen the Party's absolute leadership over the army in order to give full scope to the role of the army as the pillar of the proletarian dictatorship.

* * *

On Politics and Taoism During the Early Western Han Dynasty

by

Chai Ch'ing (翟青)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 11, November 20, 1974)

Since its founding the Western Han Dynasty basically advocated the Legalist line from the first emperor of the Han Dynasty Liu Pang through Empress Lü, Emperor Wen, Emperor Ching, Emperor Wu, Emperor Chao to Emperor Hsüan. Emperor Hsüan, Liu Hsün, had criticized Emperor Yüan of the Han Dynasty, Liu Shih, for "being meek and following Confucianism," saying "the Han family has its own system, mixing the way of right and the way of might." ("The History of Han Dynasty: Annals of Emperor Yüan") This was a profound summation of the political practices of the landlord class from the beginning of the Han Dynasty. In this regard, Wei Yüan of the Ch'ing Dynasty pointed out in his article "On Laotzu" that Emperor Hsüan of the Han Dynasty had talked about "mixing the way of right and the way of might as meaning mixing the way of right promoted by Huangti and Laotzu and the way of might promoted by Shen Pu-hai and Han Fei-tzu." In point of fact, the so-called Han system of "mixing the way of right and the way of might" was an effort to promote the Legalist line under the camouflage of Taoism. In short, it was Taoism on the surface, but Legalism in essence.

The first person to openly promote Taoism as the "learning of the world" ("On Laotzu" by Wei Yüan) among the feudal ruling circles of the early period of the Western Han Dynasty was Ts'ao Ts'an. Originally he was a jailer in P'ei county during the Ch'in Dynasty. He followed Liu Pang in "attacking cities and fighting field battles," and rendered meritorious services. He was a loyal supporter and firm executor of Liu Pang's Legalist line. In order to find out how to further consolidate the political power of the landlord class, he called in "senior officials and scholars" to discuss measures for "pacifying the people" when he was promoted to become the prime minister of the protectoral state of Ch'i. However, no conclusions were reached because "all the opinions were different," but he heard that in Chiaohsi there was a man called Kaikung who "preached Taoism well." He then invited Kaikung for consultations, and was very pleased with Kaikung's views, wholeheartedly adopting his political program that maintained "discarding all desires and worries in their minds, the people will inevitably become peaceful." On the basis of Kaikung's suggestions, Tsao Ts'an "ruled with Taoist concepts"and "governed the state with peace." He was called "a capable and upright prime minister." (Historical Records: On the Family of Prime Minister Ts'ao) After the death of Hsiao Ho, Empress Lü brought Ts'ao Ts'an back and appointed him second prime minister of the Western Han Dynasty according to Liu Pang's will. He "made no changes at all and closely followed the rules set by Hsiao Ho." He carried out his work and faithfully followed the line and policy formulated by Liu Pang and Hsiao Ho without creating anything new. Superficially he "drank good wine day and night," doing nothing, and would drag anyone looking for him to discuss political affairs off to a drinking party. He seemed to be a Taoist who advocated

the "doctrine of inaction," but in reality he guarded against those who divorced themselves from Liu Pang's Legalist line and who wanted to do something else. He "always got rid of those who sought fame and position," and invariably assigned to important positions those "honest and big-hearted persons of virtue" who faithfully implemented Liu Pang's Legalist line.

Tsao Ts'an's promotion of Taoism, although it appeared to be accidental, was historically inevitable. The replacement of the slave-owning system by the feudal system in Chinese history began "with the Warring States, lasted several hundred years through the Ch'in Dynasty and the Hsiang Yü era, and finally fixed in the early stages of the Han Dynasty." (Wang Fu-chih, "Tu T'ung Chien Lun," Vol. XI) Following the death of Ch'in Shih Huang, there was a temporary interruption of the Legalist line, which was only able to continue when Liu Pang founded the Han Dynasty. Therefore, when Empress Lü ruled in the early part of the Han Dynasty and "the whole country had only recently become stable" (Historical Records: The Family of Empress Lü's Relatives), the struggle for and against the restoration of the old was extremely fierce. It was at this time that Ts'ao Ts'an became prime minister, and his most important task became guarding Liu Pang's Legalist line to make sure that "there is no change." Ts'ao Ts'an was very clear on this point, but Emperor Hui failed to understand him. On one occasion, Emperor Hui blamed Ts'ao Ts'an for being inactive. Ts'ao asked the Emperor: Between you and Emperor Liu Pang, who is the more capable? The Emperor answered: How can I compare with him? Ts'ao asked again: Between me and Hsiao Ho, who is the more capable? The Emperor said: You too are not as capable as Hsiao Ho. Ts'ao then said: Since you and I are not as capable as the first emperor and Hsiao Ho, then you just act as emperor, and "I, Ts'ao Ts'an, will faithfully perform my duties without any mistakes, following the policy set for me. What is wrong with this?" (Historical Records: The Family of Prime Minister Ts'ao)

Ts'ao Ts'an's words "faithfully perform my duties without any mistakes" shows that the major political task of the Legalists during the reign of Empress Lü was to do their utmost to guard Liu Pang's Legalist line against any change, and to maintain the relatively stable political situation begun during the time of Liu Pang. Proceeding from the political program of "faithfully performing my duties without any mistakes," Ts'ao Ts'an adopted the Taoist doctrine which advocated "rule with inactivity," which exactly reflected the need for the consolidation and development of the victories and achievements of the struggle waged by the ruling group in the early stage of the Han Dynasty. Wang Fu-chin said: "Ts'ao Ts'an ruled with Hsiao Ho's methods," because "he had no other choice at that particular time." ("Tu T'ung Chien Lun," Vol. II) Wang had a profound understanding of the popularity of Taoism in the early stage of the Han Dynasty.

During the 15-year reign of Empress Lü, "the ruler and the officials remained inactive. Emperor Hui had no control over the situation while Empress Lü reigned over the state. Political debate was never heard outside the palace, and the whole country was at peace." (Historical Records: Annals of Empress Lü) There was a folksong at that time, which

said: "Hsiao Ho set the rules; Ts'ao Ts'an followed them, and guarded them without mistake. Free from worries and desires, the people are always at peace." (Historical Records: The Family of Prime Minister Ts'ao) This reflects more or less truthfully the political practice of the landlord class who promoted Taoism overtly but Legalism covertly during early Han. Empress Lü, Hsiao Ho, Ts'ao Ts'an and others advocated "rule with inactivity." Superficially they were "inactive," but in reality they were "active." The positive reform of the Taoist thinking which had prevailed before the Ch'in Dynasty to provide it with a new class content was a reflection of Legalist politics under the guise of Taoism.

The development of Taoism till it became the ruling philosophy of the landlord class in the early period of the Han Dynasty went through certain stages. According to the "Writings of Classics, History of Sui," "During the Han Dynasty, Ts'ao Ts'an first recommended Kaikung who preached Taoism, and Emperor Wen gave his approval. This continued, and Taoism became popular." This broadly delineates the general popularization of Taoism in the early stages of the Han Dynasty. The evolving process from "Ts'ao Ts'an's first recommendation" through "Emperor Wen's approval" to the widespread popularity of Taoism basically coincided with the growth of the political and economic strength of the landlord class in early Han.

During the early years of the Liu Pang era, "the masses were out of work and there was a big famine." (History of the Han Dynasty: Annals of Food and Goods) But, under the reign of Empress Lu, the masses had "plenty to wear and eat and the criminal code was seldom applied." (History of the Han Dynasty: Annals of the Criminal Code) This indicates that the feudal economy of the early Han Dynasty had made certain developments, that the chronic war wounds had been healed and that the stable situation during this period provided a solid foundation for the subsequent "rule of Emperor Wen and Emperor Ching."

The reason why Empress Lü was able to stabilize the world quickly after long years of war was that she persistently implemented not only the Legalist political line adopted by Liu Pang but also his Legalist organizational line. During the era of Empress Lü, "not one of her officials including Ts'ao Ts'an, Wang Ling, Ch'en P'ing and Chou Po had not previously been installed in the court by Emperor Kao--Liu Pang--to serve the Liu family." (Chao I, "Notes on Twenty-two Histories) With this group of experienced and committed Legalists assigned to key leading posts within the leading group of the central government, the implementation of the Legalist line was not interrupted, which was of great significance in consolidating the political power.

During the era of Emperor Wen and Emperor Ching, Taoism gained still greater popularity. Emperor Wen, who "was originally well versed in the criminal code," relied on Ch'en P'ing and other Legalists to govern the nation, and the government was "administered in the silent way and on the basis of the doctrine of inaction." (Ying Shao, "General Description of the Custom," Vol. II) The purpose of Emperor Wen's advocacy of Taoism was to defend in order to attack, to firmly hold on to the position occupied

by the Legalist line since Liu Pang. A favorable assessment was given to Emperor Wen's political line by Li Chih of the late years of the Ming Dynasty, when he said that this practice "was so profound that it took a step backward and strengthened its firm footing." ("General Comments on the Outline of History") During the 23 years of the reign of Emperor Wen and the 16-year reign of Emperor Ching, both the political and the economic strength of the landlord class were unprecedentedly strong. Precisely "due to the reservation of strength by Wen and Ching" (History of the Han Dynasty: Annals of Food and Goods), Emperor Wu's "extremely great capabilities" (History of the Han Dynasty: Chronicles of Emperor Wu) could be brought into full play. The political representative of those who were Taoists in appearance but Legalists in essence at this time was Empress Dowager Tou--wife of Emperor Wen. "Empress Dowager Tou was fond of the sayings of Huangti /the Yellow Emperor/ and Laotzu. The emperor (meaning Emperor Ching) and the crown prince (meaning Emperor Wu) and members of the Tou family had to read the books of Huangti and Laotzu and set great store by these books." (Historical Records: Relatives of the Empress' Family) Empress Dowager Tou was queen for 23 years, empress dowager for 16 years, and grand empress dowager for 6 years, promoting Taoism for nearly half a century. From the Marxist viewpoint, the fate of any theory or school of thought is mainly determined by the extent of its meeting the requirements of social practice. The popularity of Taoism during the early years of the Han Dynasty was due to its providing a cloak for the Legalists under the particular historical conditions of that period so as to meet the objective condition in which a stable situation was needed by the landlord class to consolidate its position.

While Taoism was warmly supported by the ruling group which followed the Legalist line during the early period of the Han Dynasty, it was violently attacked by the Confucianists. In many ways this was a reflection of the struggle between the Confucian and Legalist schools in the political-ideological field during the early years of the dynasty. A popular saying at that time went, "Those who study Laotzu are antagonistic to Confucianism and those who study Confucianism dismiss Laotzu." (Historical Records: Biographies of Laotzu and Han Fei) "Those who study Laotzu" were the Legalists. Those "who dismiss Laotzu" were the Confucianists. Superficially, this antagonism was between the Confucian and Taoist schools, but it was in essence antagonism between the Confucianists and the Legalists with the latter donning the cloak of "Taoism."

The different attitudes toward Taoism adopted by the Legalists and the Confucianists in the early years of the Han Dynasty had a historical background, but the main reason for the mutual antagonism was the political struggle during that period. History tells us that Taoism appeared during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods as a school of thought representing the interests of the lower strata of the slave-owning class and that it was opposed to Confucianism which represented the interests of the slave-owning aristocrats. Laotzu, the representative of Taoism, once criticized the Confucianists by saying "where the rites are observed, loyalty and faithfulness are gone; and this is the origin of disorder." In criticizing the Confucianists on this point, the Taoist and Legalist

schools were relatively close to each other. Among the pre-Ch'in Legalists, Shen Tao "was engaged in the study of the Taoist virtues." (Historical Records: Biographies of Mencius and Hsün Ch'ing) Shen Pu-hai "advocated the use of the criminal code while studying Taoism"; and Han Fei "was fond of studying the criminal code and other Legalist works but originated his study from Taoism." (Historical Records: Biographies of Laotzu and Han Fei) They said that "in ruling the world, Huangti promulgated the law and the masses were happy and safe because the law was not subject to change" ("Yü Lan" Index 638), depicting the legendary Huangti as a representative of the reformists. On the premise of having effected the reform, they emphatically pointed out that "an emperor possessing virtues should stress inaction but not change." (Han Fei Tzu: Understanding Laotzu) This was a part of their efforts to consolidate the rule of the Legalist line. Wei Yüan of the Ch'ing Dynasty held that Laotzu preached the way of high antiquity and wrote books of high antiquity while "originating laws from Huangti" and that this practice by him made "the popularization of Taoism as a natural thing." Wei Yüan further pointed out that Laotzu's doctrine of silence and inaction was the "ideological spearhead of the Western Han Dynasty" and that "his doctrine of inaction was different from previous doctrines of this nature because the times were also different." ("On Laotzu") Taoism in the early years of the Han Dynasty was not the pre-Ch'in Taoism; it bore the hallmark of the new era, it reflected the particular characteristics of the thinking of the Legalists. Under these conditions, the Confucianists' opposition to the Taoist school was, in reality, opposition to the Legalist school.

The Legalists approved of Taoism, while the Confucianists opposed it. We can perceive this strange situation from a debate between Yüan Ku and Huang Sheng in front of Emperor Ching. Huang Sheng believed in Taoism and was convinced that both T'ang and Wu seized the throne by killing their rulers, and "were not appointed." Yüan Ku, a scholar of the "Book of Odes" and a Confucianist, believed that "the people of the whole world were in favor of T'ang and Wu" and they were not usurpers. Huang Sheng then used the allegory that "a hat, however worn-out, is put on the head, while the clogs, though new, are always worn by the feet" to back up his call for drawing "a distinction between the high and the low" in order to defend the power of the emperor and the central authority. This was a penetrating criticism of the local secessionist forces such as Liu Pi, King of Wu, at that time.

This polemic was by no means a simple evaluation of concrete historical events or historical figures. It essentially reflected the struggle between the Confucianists who wanted a split and the Legalists who wanted unification. Yüan Ku denounced the book "Laotzu" as "words for the ruling family" and apparently tried to create public opinion in favor of the local secessionist forces that intended to rebel and weaken the central authority. No wonder that Empress Dowager Tou was very angry and ordered that Yüan Ku be thrown into a ring to fight a boar. Yüan barely escaped death. (History of the Han Dynasty: The Stories of Confucian Scholars") Besides, Tou Ying and T'ien Fen were also dismissed from their posts because "they spoke highly of Confucianism and denounced Taoism. (Historical Records: Wei Ch'i, Marquis of Wu An) It was

only after the death of Empress Dowager Tou that T'ien Fen became prime minister and reopened the case. He "demoted officials who practiced Taoism" and "appointed scholars of literature and Confucianism." (History of the Han Dynasty: The Stories of Confucian Scholars)

These facts fully reflect the deep political background of the antagonism between Confucianism and Taoism. In the initial period of the Western Han Dynasty, the central government "respected Legalism" and the whole country was basically ruled by Legalists. The supreme ruling group of the feudal system advocated "the doctrine of inaction," the purpose of which was in effect to consolidate state power and pacify the whole country so as to permit an advance along the Legalist road. Nevertheless, "the wind continued to blow and the trees still moved." Those local secessionist forces who "worshipped Confucianism" hoped that the whole country would plunge into disorder and hated the Legalists who maintained peace and continued to consolidate the country. Accordingly, they invariably did their utmost in a vain attempt to alter the relatively stable political situation and to destroy the central government which upheld the Legalist line. This situation showed that respect for or opposition to Taoism was a reflection of the ideological struggle between those who advocated restoration and those who opposed restoration at that time. It was also the focal point of the struggle between the Confucian and the Legalist lines.

Viewing the history of the initial period of the Western Han Dynasty, one can see that the struggle between the two lines, centering on restoration or counter-restoration and on a split or unity, never ceased. After the establishment of the Western Han empire, the contradictions between the feudal princes of families other than the imperial family and the central authority became acute. Six of these princes rebelled one after another. Liu Pang thought that "he had settled the troubles of the whole country." (History of the Han Dynasty: The Annals of Emperor Kao) However, due to rebellions by these princes, he had to personally "lead the troops to suppress them." By the time of Emperor Wen, the nine princes of the Liu family, whose titles were conferred on them by Liu Pang, had grown in strength and paid no attention to the central authority. By the time Emperor Ching ascended the throne, a rebellion by Liu Pi, the King of Wu, was imminent to the point that "he would rebel regardless of whether or not his title was removed." (Historical Records: Liu Pi, King of Wu) Accepting the suggestions of Legalist Ch'ao Ts'o, Emperor Ching suppressed the rebellions by Wu, Ch'u and five other states, and only then did the political power of the central authority become relatively stabilized.

It is worth nothing that most of the secessionist forces in the initial period of the Western Han Dynasty collaborated with the reactionary slave-owner aristocrats of the Huns in the northern pastoral regions. King Hsin of Han, King Ch'en Hsi of T'ai and King Lu Wan of Yen during the Liu Pang era all collaborated with the Hun aristocrats. Following the failure of their rebellions against the central authority, they capitulated to the Huns one after another. King Liu Ch'ang of Huainan during the period of Emperor Wen also collaborated with the Huns, as did three rebellious forces

of Wu, Ch'u and Chao in the period of Emperor Ching.
Prior to Emperor Wu, the Western Han empire was faced with the threat of collaboration between the Hun slave-owner aristocrats and the rebellious forces. To openly oppose and suppress them, the imperial court had to build up its strength, but this would take some time. Therefore, the feudal ruling group during the initial period of Western Han, in dealing with internal and outside troubles, had to limit the struggle according to the situation and was forced to make certain necessary compromises. The twists and turns on the road of consolidating the central power during the initial period of the Western Han Dynasty tempered and educated the landlord ruling group at that time and created the conditions for winning greater victories during the era of Emperor Wu of Han. Looking at this period of history, one can see that this relatively stable political situation was achieved through struggles and that during this relatively stable period the political situation continued to develop through zigzag struggles. Struggles are always developing along the road of twists and turns--sometimes tense and sometimes not so tense, but they never end. The only difference is the forms of their expression.

During this specific historical period of the early Han Dynasty, each step forward taken by Empress Lü, Emperor Wen and Emperor Ching in following Liu Pang's Legalist line increased the political and economical strength of the landlord class. In the process, the "Legalist" features beneath the cloak of "Taoism" also became more and more apparent. If we compare Chia I with Ch'ao Ts'o, we can see this conspicuous trend.

Chia I was a representative of the Legalist school during the period of Emperor Wen. His thinking was influenced by both Taoism and Confucianism. The complexity of his thinking was closely related to the degree to which the then feudal ruling class understood the historical experience in the rise and fall of the Ch'in Dynasty. Chia Shan, a Confucian scholar in the period of Emperor Wen, "taking Ch'in as the example," "discussed the ways of administration," slandering "the Ch'in Dynasty for using force to nibble at the territories of the various ducal states and for ignoring propriety and righteousness. It thus expedited its own ruin." (History of the Han Dynasty: The Story of Chia Shan) Being a Legalist, Chia I launched a struggle against the reactionary trend of the Confucian school in criticizing the rule of the Ch'in Dynasty. In his work "On the Fall of the Ch'in Dynasty," Chia I warmly praised the historical merits of Ch'in Shih Huang, saying that "Ch'in Shih Huang had inherited the strength of his ancestors, followed a correct policy and thus controlled all territories under heaven." However, Chia I could not thoroughly break the influence of the Confucian thinking and erroneously blamed Ch'in Shih Huang for ignoring "benevolence and righteousness." Proceeding from such a contradictory concept, it was equally contradictory for him to outline a policy of perpetual order for the ruling circles in the early period of the Han Dynasty. On the one hand, he believed that "the ways of offense and the ways of defense are different," advocating that, after seizing political power, "it is essential to attach importance to ruling the country with Tao in order to bring peace to the country." On the other, he also advocated the strategy of divide and rule through

"rebuilding the various ducal states but reducing their power." (History of the Han Dynasty: The Story of Chia I) Obviously, his concept was a product of the Taoist ideology of taking the defense for the offensive. At the same time, Chia I also talked about "benevolence and righteousness" and the rule of propriety, thus adding Confucian ideas to his Legalist thinking. It is evident that his thinking is in the main Legalist but is influenced by Confucianism and Taoism.

Ch'ao Ts'o, who was active during the period of Emperor Ching, was more progressive than Chia I. This was mainly due to his better understanding the historical experience of the Ch'in Dynasty. He clearly pointed out that the merits of Ch'in Shih Huang were much greater than simply his being called a "holy emperor." He also pointed out that the decline of the Ch'in Dynasty began "in the latter stage"--meaning the period of the Second Emperor. In his views, since Chao Kao and his ilk had changed the systems and laws of the Ch'in Dynasty, this created the "disastrous situation in which "officials felt the changes unjust, the policies were not well known and the people were insecure." (History of the Han Dynasty: The Story of Ch'ao Ts'o) Since Ch'ao Ts'o dared to affirm Ch'in Shih Huang's Legalist line, his proposals for the rule of law were daring and clearcut. As for his attitude toward the ducal states, Ch'ao Ts'o strongly proposed their abolition and his stand in this regard was much firmer than that of Chia I. He neither advocated the Confucian "benevolence and righteousness" nor prepared the "do nothing" defensive policy, but believed in initiating an offensive. Faced with the imminent revolts by ducal states, he repeatedly proposed that they be abolished and said firmly: "Unless this is done, the emperor will not be respected and the empire will be insecure!" Through Ch'ao Ts'o, the "inner part" of the Legalist thinking was fully exposed. He did not like the Confucian appearance, and he also felt that the Taoist appearance was superfluous.

Being the cloak for Legalist thinking, Taoism finally became a target for annihilation in the struggle launched by Sang Hung-yang against the Confucian scholars. At that time, the struggle waged by the landlord class since the early Han Dynasty to consolidate political power came to a conclusion and internal and external troubles were basically eliminated. Thus, the ruling feudal circles did not need a cloak to cover their Legalist proposals, and it was also no longer necessary for the Confucians to attack the Legalist line in a roundabout way. The face-to-face struggle between the Confucian and Legalist schools started once again. It took over half a century for the landlord ruling class and its Legalists in the early Han Dynasty to don and doff the Taoist cloak. This was a small twist in the history of the struggle between the Confucian and Legalist schools, deeply reflecting the devious and complex nature of the ideological struggles among the various schools in history.

During the early Han Dynasty, the feudal ruling class' advocacy of Taoism was a clearcut class policy of the landlord class. In that time, its stand was both positive and negative. Like all other exploiting classes, the landlord class regarded the seizure of political power as the end of revolution. After seizing political power, the landlord class

was unable to propose any new revolutionary tasks and dreamed of perpetual rule and security. However, the paradise of the exploiting classes could not be secure forever, and there was no way to achieve perpetual rule and security. No exploiting class can escape its historical destiny of proceeding from progressiveness to reaction and from being a real tiger to becoming a paper tiger. It is different for the proletariat, for its class interests and historical destiny correspond fully with the general trend of the development of history. Therefore, it can persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, propose new revolutionary tasks in time and continuously carry on the revolution in depth. However, it should be appreciated that the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie does not develop in a straight line--sometimes it slows down and at other times it proceeds in zigzag fashion. Summing up the experiences of class struggle in history will help us understand still better the varied conditions and varied forms of class struggle in various stages of development. Through struggle, we have scored great victories in the great proletarian cultural revolution and in the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius; now we are launching a new struggle to consolidate our victories and to win new ones. Under these circumstances, it is still more necessary for us to use the concept of "one divides into two" to continue to sum up the experiences in class struggle and two-line struggle and to deepen our understanding of their laws and characteristics so as to adopt appropriate measures to cope with changing conditions and to win victory for the proletariat.

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Struggle and Keep to the Theoretical Position of Marxists

- Some observations on the study of Critique of the Gotha Program

by

Kung Hsin (宮欣)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 11, November 20, 1974)

Altogether 99 years have elapsed since great teacher Marx's brilliant work Critique of the Gotha Program (hereafter Critique) came into being. This "remarkable work," in Lenin's words, for the first time made a systematic theoretical summation of the two-line struggle within the German Workers' Party and theoretically and completely reckoned with the Lassallean opportunist trend of thought. This work is an important document of the international communist movement. Our conscientious study of this brilliant work today will be of great realistic as well as far-reaching historical significance to raising our awareness of keeping to the theoretical position of Marxism and struggling to defend it.

The spread of Marxist theory, judging from the publication in 1847 of Marx's first mature work The Poverty of Philosophy to his completion of Critique in 1875, had a history of 28 years. These 28 years marked the ever widening propagation of Marxism among the worker masses. "Once theory is in the grip of the masses it will also turn into a material force." Guided by Marxist theory in these 28 years the working class in Europe whipped up mighty revolutionary movements, transforming the "class in itself" to the "class for itself," founding the First International (International Workers' Association), starting the great Paris Commune uprising and practicing proletarian seizure of political power. This short span of 28 years, however, amply demonstrated the great vitality of Marxist theory.

Lenin pointed out: "The development of Marxism and the spread and consolidation of Marxist ideas among the working class inevitably caused the bourgeoisie to attack Marxism with increasing frequency and violence." The entire history since the inception of Marxism has proved the correctness of Lenin's thesis. This was particularly true during 1847-1875, a period marked by unforgettable developments. The bourgeois view of Marxist theory at the time generally may be divided into three steps: The first step was taken when Marxism came into being and was beginning to spread. They mobilized all available reactionary public opinion to revile and attack Marxism, identifying it with "floods and ferocious beasts" and vainly trying to strangle it in its cradle. However, "no amount of abusing and intimidating can take the place of fighting." It was amid the abuse and intimidation of bourgeois reactionaries that Marxism began to spread on an even wider scale among the workers and young students. This led to the second step, with the bourgeois reactionaries resisting Marxism

with silent intrigues. This conspiracy had already appeared in 1859 when Marx's brilliant work Critique of Political Economy was published, assuming serious proportions in 1867 when the first volume of Marx's stupendous work Capital was off the press. The bourgeoisie had expected that Marxist theory would forever be submerged in silence but their wishful thinking just came to naught. In less than four years after the publication of the first volume of Capital the Parisians launched the first proletarian revolution in the history of mankind by fiercely attacking the old world. "The triumph of Marxist theory forced its enemies to disguise themselves as Marxists, this being in keeping with historical dialectics." Thereupon, the bourgeoisie took the third step. They wormed their way into the Marxist ranks and disguised themselves as Marxists to oppose Marxism. The appearance of Lassallean opportunism from the sixties to the seventies of the 19th century was related to the class struggle which had prevailed at the time. As Engels rightly pointed out: "In Lassalle's provocative pamphlets correct things taken from Marx are mixed with his own and usually erroneous arguments, making it almost impossible to distinguish between the two." The Gotha Program (hereafter Gotha) follows a similar approach. "Most of its general principles are copied from the Communist Manifesto and the Rules of the International but are so revised that they are either totally out of context or become patent fallacies." This way to confound people proved quite effective. Since the Lassalleans invented this stratagem all opportunists and revisionists have treasured it. Both Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta approved of this approach and showed their appreciation by deleting and distorting at will sections of Gotha and then bluntly questioned others whether or not they had read them. This resembled nothing more than the arrogant stance of a gangster.

Engels said long ago: "Our Party has the great advantage of having a new scientific world outlook as its theoretical basis." In summing up the struggle centering on Gotha, he exhorted the German proletarian political party: "Your Party needs socialist science," adding: "Any discord between the German Party and socialist science is a source of vast misfortune and humiliation, let alone a split." Marxist theory is the theoretical basis guiding the thinking of the proletarian political party, the compass for the party's actions. Therefore, distinguishing genuine from sham Marxism and defending the purity of Marxism is to the proletarian political party a matter of primary importance. "Only by taking advanced theory as the guide can a party assume the role of an advanced fighter." The struggle centering around Gotha was essentially a theoretical struggle in which Marxism defeated opportunism.

Despite the Marxist cloak donned by Lassallean opportunism, it was not difficult to identify it. Before Gotha was released leaders of the Eisenachers did to a certain extent resist and criticize the fallacies dished up by the Lassalleans such as building socialism by relying on reactionary Prussian "state aid," "ironlaw of wages" and "one reactionary mass." But why did some leaders of the Eisenachers later approve of the Lassallean fallacies and incorporate them in the Party program for adoption at the Gotha Congress? One of the reasons was that they belittled the importance of revolutionary theory and were content with insignificant

successes gained in day-to-day affairs. The question of theory which concerns the question of world outlook is fundamental to the political line. Marxism represents the world view of the proletariat, the basic premise whereby the proletariat is able to operate as an independent political force. Under the condition of the proletariat winning one victory after another in its struggle in particular, various factions would turn to the proletariat, though in so doing the former's motives differ from each other. There are as many classes as there are -isms. If at this juncture a proletarian political party fails to keep to the theoretical position of Marxism, it is likely to be associated with idealist theories of every description until it renounces its own world outlook and becomes the appendage of the bourgeoisie. This has occured in the history of our Party. For instance, when our Party and the Kuomintang (KMT) espoused the anti-Japanese national united front Wang Ming and company sprang out to spread the "everything through the united front" slogan, meaning that everything must go through the KMT's Right-inclined capitulationism. Chairman Mao promptly refuted this slogan. He raised this issue: "In the united front will the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie or the bourgeoisie lead the proletariat?" After formulating for our Party a policy of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands in the united front, Chairman Mao clearly pointed out: "Communist Party members may in political actions form a united front against imperialism and feudalism with certain adherents of idealist theory and even religious followers, but under no circumstances should they approve of their idealist theory or religious dogma." Only by defending the purity of Marxist theory in the united front was it possible for our Party to lead our allies to carry out victorious struggle and defeat all enemies. Today, our Party has united all that can be united. This is a mark of our Party and state becoming more and more thriving and prosperous. This unity is built on the basis of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tsetung thought, a base that is indestructible. In order to further strengthen the great revolutionary unity of the whole Party, the whole army and the people of the whole country, we must heighten our vigilance and continue to struggle against the class enemies at home and abroad who conspire to undermine our unity. And in this struggle Marxist theory is the most important weapon in our hands.

Gotha is a program theoretically replete with ambiguities and confused phrases. However, Liebknecht, leader of the Eisenachers, highly approved of it. The appearance of Gotha laid bare the most superficial understanding of socialist ideas on the part of the leaders of the Eisenachers. In 1874, that is, one year prior to the release of Gotha, Engels in the article Supplementary Foreword to the 1870 Edition of "The German Peasant War" (hereafter Foreword) expressed gratification at the German workers standing in the van of the proletarian struggle at that time. But then Engels pointed out: "How long the turn of events would allow them to occupy this position of honor" would depend on "the leaders' thorough understanding of assorted theoretical problems and their obligation to free themselves from the influence of traditional rhetoric that belongs to the old world outlook." Engels' prediction was confirmed in 1875 by the leaders of the Eisenachers. At that time,

Liebknacht, one of the leaders of the Eisenachers, had long been hazy about questions pertaining to theory because he failed to study Marxism seriously. Although he had disagreed with the Lassalleans about their fallacious advocacy of the "one reactionary mass," he was unable to use Marxist theory to refute this fallacy. Believing that the use of voting would solve questions pertaining to theory, he was responsible for entering the fallacy regarding the "one reactionary mass" into Gotha. This was a penetrating lesson. If a party cadre relies solely on the organization to solve everything without conscientiously studying Marxism and having a firm hold of the ideological line, he would invariably be defeated by opportunism. Chairman Mao has attached great importance to Party cadres' study of theory. As early as the Anti-Japanese War, he pointed out: "In terms of shouldering leading responsibilities, the fighting strength of our Party will be greatly raised if we have 100 to 200 comrades who have systematically and in a practical manner mastered Marxism-Leninism." During the entire period of the new democratic and socialist revolution, Chairman Mao invariably instructed our Party cadres to comprehend a little more of Marxism. Since the 2nd Plenary Session of the 9th Party Central Committee Chairman has repeatedly called upon the whole Party, particularly those cadres at the top and intermediate levels, to "read and study seriously and have a good grasp of Marxism." Only by having a good grasp of Marxism can we comprehend the Party's program, line, principles and policies. And only then can we theoretically distinguish genuine from sham Marxism, and not fall victim to political swindlers like Liu Shao-ch'i, Wang Ming and Lin Piao.

Apart from reminding leading Party cadres to grasp firmly Marxist theory, Engels in Foreword referred to the historical task of "spreading ardently among the worker masses ideas (referring to Marxist theory) that have become increasingly clear to themselves." This is fraught with far-reaching significance. It would be impossible for the workers to produce Marxism spontaneously and they have to depend on instructions given by the vanguard of the proletariat before they can have a firm hold of Marxist theory as a weapon. The Eisenachers did some work about spreading Marxism. However, due to the low Marxist level of the leaders of that Party, work done in this respect was far from adequate. As a result, after Gotha was released "none attempted to analyze openly the real content of any of the strange subjects," and the book appeared to be a communist interpretation. This shows that the German workers at that time upheld Marxism but had not really had a good grasp of it. Thus when the Lassalleans donned the cloak of Marxism to oppose Marxism, some people were liable to be taken in by them. With this in mind, 15 years after the publication of Marx's Critique and at a time when the German Workers' Party was formulating a new program, Engels resolutely overcame the interference of the opportunist trend of thought and made public Critique in a move to arm the Party rank and file and the worker masses. This wise move by Engels achieved quick results, like "a stone sending up ripples of waves." The publication of Critique led to vast repercussions among the German workers movement. As Engels rightly said, "All those who deserve mention in respect to theory are on my side." The Party rank and file and the workers came forward. They could see more clearly and improved their ability to distinguish genuine

from sham Marxism, providing the 1891 Ilford Congress with the mass foundation for drawing a line of demarcation with Lassallean opportunism. History has proved that we must "frequently and repeatedly explain a particular line and a particular viewpoint, not just to a few but to the vast numbers of the revolutionary masses." What all opportunists and revisionists fear most is hundreds of millions of the revolutionary masses having a good grasp of the Marxist truth for once this is in the grip of the masses there will be no market for revisionism. Therefore, they have done their best to divorce Marxism from the masses. This was so with the Lassalleans. It was also true with people like Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. Talking rubbish, Lin Piao said: "Marxism-Leninism is too remote from us." He also babbled, "The workers do their jobs well and the peasants tend the fields well, this being politics." He said so in a vain attempt to divorce Marxism-Leninism from the masses, obstruct the broad worker and peasant masses from having a good grasp of Marxist theory, and pave the way for the promotion of revisionist theory. All this, however, was of no avail -- like a mantis trying to raise its forearms to stop an approaching cart, without being able to get anything done. Throughout the world Marxist theory is advancing from victory to victory. Following the great proletarian cultural revolution in China, Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tsetung thought have been popularized as never before. The deepening of the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius all the more gives impetus to a mass movement to promote Marxist education. A mighty contingent of theorists composed of the workers, peasants and soldiers is flourishing as new upsurges have appeared in the surging mass movement to study Marxism and repudiate revisionism. The vast numbers of revolutionary masses understand that reading books seriously and poring over Marxist-Leninist works and Chairman Mao's writings provides the key to deepening the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. The victories of the great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius have proved that whoever practices revisionism in China will certainly be resisted and repudiated by hundreds of millions of the revolutionary masses -- a short life indeed.

Marx's Critique indicates the direction and illuminates the path for the proletariat of the world to keep to the theoretical position of Marxism. Seriously studying Marx's brilliant work, Engels' letters in respect of Gotha and the historical experience whereby Marxism defeated Lassallean opportunism will vigorously spur us to popularize, deepen and carry on the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius to the very end. This effort will likewise encourage us to keep to the struggle in the superstructure so that Marxism will prevail over revisionism and the proletariat over the bourgeoisie and the theoretical position of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tsetung thought further consolidated.

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In Studying the History of Confucian-Legalist Struggle It Is Necessary To Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend

- some observations on the study of "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People"

by

Lo Ying (罗英)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an [Study and Criticism], No. 11, November 20, 1974)

In the article "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," Chairman Mao points out: "Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend is the policy for promoting the progress of the arts and the sciences and a flourishing socialist culture in our land. Different forms and styles in art should develop freely and different schools in science should contend freely." In the study of sciences, our Party has always encouraged free contention between different points of view and schools of thought, and persisted in the policy of letting a hundred schools of thought contend to solve questions of right and wrong in order to achieve the goal of unifying thinking among people. To actively encourage a hundred schools of thought to contend and to correctly handle ideological differences while studying the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle will make for further development of the excellent situation on the theoretical front.

At present, the study of the history of the struggle between the Confucian and Legalist schools has turned into a widespread mass movement. Numerous different interpretations have been advanced by people from many different angles. The correctness or incorrectness of these different opinions can be determined only by comparison and analysis with the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method, by letting a hundred schools of thought contend, that is, the method of democratic discussion. The study of the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle as an ideological issue reflects the economy and politics of a given society. Among the differences of opinion arising from the study some are related to the question of class stand. For instance, he who uses the Confucian method of annotating Legalist works will depart from the goal of using Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought as the guide in explaining Legalist works to serve the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This gives rise to questions of being right and wrong. But many of the different interpretations of the meaning of phrases are merely problems requiring joint exploration. In dealing with ideological problems among the people and questions of right and wrong in science, we can only adopt the method of putting facts on the table, reasoning things out and holding an adequate debate. It is impermissible for us to adopt over-simplified methods or the method of giving administrative orders.

The scientific and militant nature of Marxist attitude toward study are always closely interrelated. Chairman Mao says: "There is only one most powerful and effective weapon for the proletariat, and that is a solemn and militant scientific attitude. The Communist Party does not rely on frightening people to subsist; it relies on the truth of Marxism-Leninism, on the verification of facts to get at the truth and on science to subsist." In our study of the history of the struggle between Confucian and Legalist schools, only by maintaining a practical and realistic attitude, by studying and investigating conscientiously, and by possessing detailed information which is subject to scientific analysis and synthesis can we deduce inherent and not conjectural laws from objective things. It just won't work for one not to carry out study and investigation conscientiously but be content with empty talk or jump to conclusions the basis of fragmentary and unreliable data or affirm or negate everything rashly. Science has to be studied earnestly; there is no room for mischief. If scientific research is devoid of a scientific character and a realistic attitude, there can never be any real militancy.

In encouraging a hundred schools of thought to contend, it is necessary to permit criticism and counter-criticism, to allow people with different opinions to retain their own views. Except for those who stubbornly take the landlord-bourgeois stand, frantically play up Confucius and Confucian doctrines and refuse to change over, both sides in a debate should adopt the "unity--criticism--unity" approach in dealing with the different views of the other. Such criticism should take account of the overall situation and be based on facts, fully sensible and convincing. Subjective assertions, abuse and intimidation, indiscriminate or one-sided accusation and wholesale negation by picking on a certain point will not help to unify comrades or clarify problems. In developing criticism, we must modestly listen to the views of others and adopt the solemn attitude of being courageous in upholding the truth and daring at correcting mistakes. We must be good at examining our views from the criticisms of others and find out which is correct and which is incorrect, which is basically correct and which is not complete. At the same time, we must also analyze the views of others, accepting the good ones and criticizing the bad. We must see that different persons should have different opinions because of their different background, but that by means of free and comradely discussion and criticism and by fully exposing contradictions, we will be better able to overcome various mistakes and one-sided notions and to achieve more or less a uniformity of views and arrive at a more correct, complete and penetrating understanding. If we cannot patiently listen to opposing views and the criticisms of others and are afraid of them, we will have failed to adopt the Marxist scientific attitude. Marx said rightly: "Truth may best be compared to a flintstone -- the harder you strike it, the more brilliant will be the spark it emits." Marxism is a scientific truth and is not afraid of criticism. It has developed in the struggle with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas, and it can only develop in struggle.

During the study of the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle it is necessary to pay attention to the role of teaching material by negative

example. Positive and negative examples are opposites in a unity. If we do not know negative things, we shall not be able to clearly elucidate positive things. As Chairman Mao points out: "What is correct invariably develops in the course of struggle with what is wrong. The true, the good and the beautiful always exist by contrast with the false, the evil and the ugly, and grow in struggle with the latter." Science has always been developed in the course of the struggle between opposites. Did the Legalist ideology over the ages not develop in the course of the struggle with its opposite, the reactionary Confucian ideology? Similarly, Marxism was born and developed in the study of the bourgeoisie and criticism of bourgeois and various anti-Marxist ideas. If Marxists do not come into contact and study the bourgeoisie and various reactionary ideologies, they cannot hope to develop Marxism through struggle. Today, due to the presence in society of classes, class contradictions and class struggle as well as the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and between the socialist and capitalist roads, there will inevitably appear various anti-Marxist, idealist, metaphysical and other erroneous trends of thought. These things are bound to be reflected and spring out to engage Marxism. Therefore, to uphold Marxism, we must come into contact with and study these negative things. "We must carefully distinguish between what is really a poisonous weed and what is really a flagrant flower. Together with the masses of people, we must learn to differentiate carefully between the two and to use correct methods to fight the poisonous weeds." "Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat." Teachers by negative example of all kinds in the world, proceeding from their reactionary class stands, both hate and fear the truth and cast forth various reactionary views. By coming into contact with and studying these negative things, we will be able to increase our knowledge of class struggle and gain more experience of struggle against the enemy so we may better criticize and defeat them and in the course of criticism and struggle we will improve our ability to distinguish between flagrant flowers and poisonous weeds. On the contrary, if we are afraid to come into contact with and study the opposites and forbid people to see the fallacious and ugly things and know the opposites and negative things, that will lead to degeneration in the thinking of people, rendering them incapable of distinguishing between fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds and of weathering the storms in the world.

The Party's policy of letting a hundred schools of thought contend is one for correctly handling the contradictions among the people, mobilizing all positive factors and uniting with all the forces that can be united with. As Chairman Mao points out: "We are prepared to use this policy of contending to unite several million intellectuals and change their existing features." By continuing to implement this policy, we can further unite and transform the intellectuals and encourage them, while integrating with the masses of workers and peasants, to go on studying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought and transforming themselves to bring about a fundamental change in their world outlook. At the same time, we must also see that in our socialist country letting a hundred schools of thought contend is not the business of a few people, but the cause of the broad

masses of people. In doing all things, our Party adheres to the mass-line method "from the masses, back to the masses." In scientific study, we must also adopt this method. Not only must we fully arouse scientists, but what is more important, we must arouse the broad masses of workers and peasants in order to whip up an extensive, penetrating and sustained mass movement. Today, as we are unfolding the study of the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle, do we not see a vigorous and dynamic situation marked by a hundred schools of thought contending, with the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers and intellectuals holding joint discussion and debate? This will effectively guarantee the development of science and the development and consolidation of the theoretical position of Marxism. It provides the best school for building a proletarian contingent of science theorists. It is precisely in such a struggle that large groups of theoretical fighters have appeared from among the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. Faced with the rapid growth of this force of Marxist theorists, we must conscientiously foster revolutionary newborn forces and actively encourage professional theorists to integrate with the workers, peasants and soldiers. It is necessary to have theoretical workers integrated with practical workers. In his speech "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" published in 1942, Chairman Mao already urged people with book knowledge to integrate with people experienced in work. He said: "Those with book knowledge must develop in the direction of practice; it is only in this way that they will stop being content with books and avoid committing dogmatist errors. Those experienced in work must take up the study of theory and must read seriously; only then will they be able to systematize and synthesize their experience and raise it to the level of theory, only then will they not mistake their partial experience for universal truth and commit empiricist errors." People engaged in theoretical work and people enaged in practical work should learn from one another and make progress together -- this will greatly benefit the development and consolidation of the theoretical position of Marxism and to the revolutionary cause as a whole.

In class society, the struggle among various trends and schools of thought in the course of a hundred schools of thought contending is, in the final analysis, subordinate to a given class struggle and line struggle. They directly or indirectly reflect the interests and demands of given classes and are related overtly or covertly to the class struggle and line struggle of the time. History proves: whenever a big change was taking place in society and class struggle was violent, the struggle in the academic and ideological spheres would also be most acute. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods in China, a hundred schools of thought were contending. Basically, the Confucian school, supported by the declining slave-owning class, and the Legalist school, supported by the newly emerging landlord class, were locked in struggle between two lines -- that is, the line upholding and restoring the slave system and that maintaining and developing the feudal system. The contending among the hundreds schools of thought today is, in the final analysis, contending between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Such contending is unfolded closely around the struggle between the two classes and two

lines. It is a proletarian policy to encourage all schools of thought to contend, with the objective of upholding Marxism and serving the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without the guidance of Marxism, letting a hundred schools of thought contend will result in bourgeois liberalism, and this we must resolutely oppose. We are firmly convinced that as long as we seriously study the works of Marx and Lenin as well as the writings of Chairman Mao and actively implement the Party's policy of letting a hundred schools of thought contend, we shall definitely be able to consolidate and develop the theoretical position of Marxism and further promote the study of the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle.

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Declaration of Ch'ienchin Farm

(Adopted at a Representative Worker Conference of the Farm on October 23, 1974)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 11, November 20, 1974)

The great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius have washed away, and are washing away, the muddy water of revisionism and the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. Their socialist enthusiasm generated still more fully, the broad masses of people are marching forward along the broad socialist path with greater resolve. This is so with our Ch'ienchin /March Forward/ Farm.

As each high tide of socialist revolution appears, dazzling long-range prospects are as a rule opened up before people's eyes, inspiring them to take a positive, serious attitude in planning their bright future. As we have seen, amid the song of triumph for the great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, people on all fronts of the socialist cause are going into action. A new high tide in mapping out overall plans and quickening the pace of socialist construction is taking shape.

"Ch'ienchin Farm must march forward!" This is a firm pledge by the vast masses of workers of Ch'ienchin Farm. We are determined to change further the farm's features with our own hands and draw the latest and most beautiful picture on a precious island of the mother country -- the Ch'ungming Island, and make due contributions to the great socialist mother country!

I

"Historical experience merits attention." Today's Ch'ienchin Farm is a development of yesterday's Ch'ienchin Farm. To sum up our farm's historical experience will be of vital significance to the correct planning of the farm's future.

Our farm does not have a long history. Only eleven years have elapsed since it was founded in 1963. But what an extraordinary eleven years!

Before 1960 the northern part of the Ch'ungming Island was still a large piece of saline swampy area. "When the tide comes, it is flooded; when the tide recedes, it is left with reeds. On sunny days it is white and sandy; on rainy days it is muddy and wet." From 1960 to 1962, the heroic working class of Shanghai, resisting the adverse current of the revisionist line pushed by Liu Shao-ch'i and company, guided by Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, and in response to Chairman Mao's great call for going in for agriculture and grain production in a big way, organized a 30,000-man reclamation army, which marched into the island to wage an arduous battle for "vying with the sea for land and getting grain from

the swamp." They set up eight state farms including our Ch'ienchin Farm. Without the gallant efforts of the working class our farm would not have existed. After the farm was set up, the battle has to be carried on by us, the younger generation of the working class.

"When a thunderstorm arises from the earth, there is left a heap of white bones." Ch'ienchin Farm was founded amid struggle, and has been developing amid struggle. After the farm was formally established in 1963, an acute struggle between two lines was unfolded over the question of how the farm should be run. Under interference by the revisionist line, the farm practiced command by profits and material incentives in a big way. There was the call for "hiring labor from the outside to till the land with money allotted by the state." Workers of the farm were put under strict control; if they did not do so well as expected, their wages would be deducted. The just spirit of socialism was suppressed; the evil spirit of capitalism was rampant. The output of the farm was low but its cost was high. Heavy losses were sustained. In the period between 1964 and 1969, the annual output of grain of the farm hovered around 500-600 catties per mow and that of ginned cotton around 70-80 catties.

The great proletarian cultural revolution brought the farm a new life. In 1968, a large group of Red Guards, answering Chairman Mao's great call, arrived at the farm. This caused drastic changes in the outlook of the whole farm. Together with the Red Guards, the farm's revolutionary workers scathingly criticized Liu Shao-ch'i's revisionist line on managing the farm and lifted the lid of class struggle on the farm. They set up a leading squad combining the old, the middle-aged and the young and whipped up a mass movement for "learning from Tachai in agriculture." During the struggle for criticizing Lin Piao and rectifying the style of work and that for criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, the workers of the whole farm considerably enhanced their consciousness of line struggle and socialist activism. Both the production features of the farm and the spiritual outlook of its workers underwent profound changes.

"The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything." The short history of a dozen years of the farm has once more borne witness to this immutable truth. Since 1970 per-mow output of grain and cotton has grown annually by an average of 20 and 10 percent respectively. The annual per-mow output of grain surpassed the target set in the National Program for Agricultural Development in 1972 and exceeded 1,000 catties in 1973. On the 13,000 mow of grain fields on the farm, the average per-mow output in 1973 was 1,036 catties; on the 5,200 mow of cotton fields the average per-mow output of ginned cotton was 117 catties. In both cases output was double that before the great cultural revolution. More than 11,000 hogs and more than 100,000 chickens were bred in 1973; forestry, fishery and sideline occupations were also developing.

Since 1970, in compliance with the spirit of Chairman Mao's "May 7" directive, we have set up 27 factories run either by the farm or its companies. Nearly half of the factories serve agriculture, including a farm

machine building plant, a bearing plant, a cotton ginning plant, a grain and oil-bearing crops processing plant, and an oil pump repair plant. The gross value of industrial output in 1973 amounted to 7,190,000 yuan. In the three years from 1971 to 1973, with the number of workers increased by more than 4,700, the farm supplied the state with more than 1,500,000 catties of commodity grain. The farm will cease incurring losses and will gloriously provide funds to the state in 1974.

Particularly, during the great proletarian cultural revolution and the struggle to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, a generation of new people, trained on the farm and developing morally, intellectually and physically, is growing up sturdily. Since 1970, 354 fine young people have joined the Chinese Communist Party and more than 2,500 young people the Communist Youth League. From 1971 to 1973, we also supplied more than 5,300 young people to the other fronts of socialist construction.

Today, standing on the high and broad causeway built by Shanghai's working class, we can gaze at the magnificent Yangtze River to the north and the green fields to the south; flat highways and tractor roads criss-cross, wide trunk canals and irrigation and drainage channels are linked up. Fifty-nine dense forest belts line up in rows. Each square block of the 269 blocks of land measures about 60 mow. The more than 20 factories run by the farm and companies are distributed in the green fields. The great land of the farm presents a beautiful picture. Faced with this soul-stirring scene, the 13,000 workers of the farm, displaying a high fighting spirit, are determined to follow Chairman Mao's "May 7" directive by taking grain as the key link in bringing about an overall development of the economy and to build the state farm gradually into a socialist state enterprise integrating town and country, industry and agriculture and mental and physical labor, and into a great school of Mao Tsetung thought where members are peasants, industrial workers, students and soldiers rolled into one. We are convinced that as long as we adhere to the Party's basic line and continue to raise our consciousness of class and line struggles and of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we shall certainly be able to make our Ch'ienchin Farm march forward bravely in the direction indicated by Chairman Mao, riding on the wind and breaking the waves!

II

"In the main, the masses of people and young students should be guided not to look backward but to look forward." Reviewing the historical experience of the farm is for the purpose of creating a more beautiful future. In the midst of the upsurge of the struggle for criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, the farm's workers, after heated discussion and debate, jointly drew up a plan (draft) for the development of the farm from 1975 to 1980. The basic gist of the plan (draft) is this:

(1) Make clear the specially important position of agriculture in socialist construction, vigorously develop agriculture, and consolidate the state farm.

Agriculture, being the foundation of the national economy, is also the foundation of other construction undertakings of the state farm. From first to last it is the farm's important task to adhere to the socialist orientation, carry out the policy of "taking grain as the key link and insuring overall development" and rapidly increase the production of grain, cotton and oil-bearing crops. By 1980 annual per-mow output of grain will increase to between 1,600 and 1,700 catties, representing a rise of about 60 percent over 1973. On the basis of the projected per-mow output of 1,700 catties, by 1980 the acreage of grain fields will be enlarged to 15,000 mow in addition to 2,000 mow to be reclaimed. (With per-mow output surpassing the "Program" target) the gross output of grain will amount to 27,800,000 catties. After deducting 2,000,000 catties for seeds, 10,000,000 catties for fodder and 9,100,000 catties for food grain for the existing 13,000 workers, some 6,700,000 catties of commodity grain may be provided to the state. By 1980 per-mow output of ginned cotton will grow to 170 catties, a 45.3 percent increase over 1973; per-mow output of rapeseed will grow to 300 catties, a 237 percent increase over 1973. Except for a portion to be used for consumption by the farm workers themselves, the greater part of the cotton and oil-bearing crops will go to aid national socialist construction.

With grain as the key link, a diversified economy is to be developed in an all-round manner. Livestock breeding with hogs as the principal item will also be vigorously developed. By 1980, live hogs bred in the whole farm will number 30,000 head, a 160 percent increase over 1973 and an average of 1.6 hogs for each mow of land. Milk cows will be bred energetically. Besides, forestry, fishery, planting of medicinal herbs, growing of melons, fruit and fungus, and bamboo and willow weaving and other sideline occupations will be developed generally.

If the object of increasing agricultural production is to be achieved, it is necessary to make great efforts to develop water conservation capital construction in the fields, to further level the land, perfect the water conservation systems, dredge and widen eight large-sized waterways for both irrigation and drainage purposes so that the saline content of the soil will generally drop to below 0.1 percent. Further efforts are to be made to quicken the pace of farm mechanization. On the basis of achieving in the main mechanization of plowing, irrigation and drainage and threshing, positive efforts are to be made to initiate research on, manufacture and extend seedling pulling machines, seedling transplanters, raking machines and harvesters so as to solve emphatically the problem of "four back bending." The supply of organic fertilizer will be further increased. Apart from raising more hogs, it will be necessary to grow more manure crops, to accumulate green composite manure and pond mud in a big way. The multiple cropping index of grain should be further increased from 2.14 in 1974 to 2.4 by 1980.

Overall implementation of the "8-Word Charter" for agriculture and introduction of scientific farming are important measures for boosting agricultural output. Our farm has more educated youths who have a relatively high cultural level. This is conducive to the development

of mass scientific experimental activities and to setting up a Red-expert scientific farming contingent. It is necessary to strengthen the farm's agricultural research station, which should supply the farm with fine seeds, organize exchange of experience, popularize new agro-techniques, explore the laws pertaining to high yields of grain and cotton, and gradually master cultivation and management techniques to make per-mow output of wheat exceed 600 catties, that of early rice exceed 1,000 catties, that of late rice exceed the "Program" target, and that of cotton exceed 200 catties. The basic force of scientific farming lies in agricultural companies. Apart from unfolding mass scientific farming activities, the companies should set up according to plan a relatively stable contingent of agro-technicians, establish scientific research classes, and run high-yield plots, experimental plots and seeds plot well to lead the whole company in practicing scientific farming.

It is necessary to go on developing in depth the mass movement for "learning from Tachai in agriculture." We should seriously learn from the poor and lower-middle peasants in rural people's communes and strengthen ties and cooperation and mutual exchange of production experience with people's communes surrounding the farm. The farm should aid the people's communes in expanding their collective economy by supplying high-yield strains, extending advanced techniques and training machine mechanics on a rotation basis.

(2) On the basis of vigorously developing agriculture, existing industrial enterprises should be run positively in accordance with the state unified plans; in light of needs and possibilities, new industrial enterprises should be built in a systematic way.

For the farm to establish industries and agricultural workers to do industrial jobs and take the "May 7" road indicated by Chairman Mao is a strategic measure for promoting the integration of town and country and between industry and agriculture and for progressively reducing the differences between them. The purpose of developing the farm's industries is always to promote the expansion of agriculture, to fully tap the labor potential of the farm workers, and to prepare conditions for gradually reducing the three major differences. On the question of developing the farm's industries, it is necessary to criticize the revisionist line that places output value first and profits in command.

In developing industries, the farm must give priority to industries that serve agriculture and then secondary consideration to industries that serve the large industries in the city, the livelihood of the urban and rural population and exports. In terms of administrative structure, it is necessary to continue to insist on having the farm and its companies run industries simultaneously and to arouse fully the activism at these two levels in doing so.

By 1980, apart from vigorously strengthening the existing agricultural machine building plant run by the farm and continuing to run well and expand the existing bearing plant, lock-making plant, industrial machinery

plant, and the wrist-watch assembly plant, we shall also build a number of other plants, in particular a diesel oil engine plant, gradually advancing from producing parts and accessories to producing whole sets. At the same time, every agricultural company shall have one or two small-sized plants of its own.

Capital for industries run by the farm and companies should be basically created through accumulation of funds by existing industries. Equipment needed for industrial development, especially special machine tools, should in the main be made by the farm itself, and manpower required should be allocated by the farm headquarters in a centralized manner on the premise of first guaranteeing satisfaction of the needs for manpower on the agricultural front. Factories run by the farm and companies should gradually establish a relatively stable force of cadres and force of technicians who are both Red and expert.

All units and departments throughout the farm should, in accordance with Chairman Mao's teaching "Run all enterprises with diligence and frugality," continue to criticize the bourgeois style of "running farms by pampered sons and daughters," strive to raise labor productivity, tighten up business accounting, save on expenditures, and lower production costs. In particular, they should reduce the agricultural costs by a big margin and increase accumulation of funds. By 1980, the aggregate of funds provided by the farm to the state over the years up to 1980 should offset -- with a slight surplus -- the total amount of investments made by the state up to 1980 (estimated at over 28 million yuan).

(3) It is necessary to firmly follow the "May 7" road. Farm workers, while taking agriculture (including forestry, livestock breeding, sideline production and fishery) as their main jobs, must also study industry, military affairs, politics and culture, and criticize the bourgeoisie. The farm should be made a great school of Mao Tsetung thought to turn out Red and expert successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat.

With a view to enabling large numbers of educated youths to be tempered in the three great revolutionary movements so as to provide the socialist cause with a continuing flow of useful people who are both Red and expert and who can write and fight, it is necessary to adhere to the Party's basic line and take the socialist road from beginning to end as well as positively organizing all farm workers to take part in the current class and line struggles, to go on criticizing the old institutions and old ideas, to fight against the disruptive activities of the class enemy, and in particular, to plunge actively into the current struggle to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius so as to grow up in struggle. It is imperative for them to make assiduous reading of Marxist-Leninist works and Chairman Mao's works, in particular Chairman Mao's military writings, and to criticize Lin Piao's bourgeois military line. It is important that in the course of struggle a contingent of Marxist theorists be trained and expanded to constitute a path-breaking force in leading the masses to study Marxist-Leninist works and Chairman Mao's works and to criticize revisionism and

the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. It is necessary to run well the spare-time university and short-course classes of the farm, so that in this way some 17,500 persons may be trained by separate stages and groups. By 1980, over 75 percent of the workers will have graduated from the farm's spare-time university. It is imperative to strengthen the building of the militia and to put it on a firm footing organizationally, politically and militarily. The system of cadres participating in collective productive labor must be maintained, and a system should be fixed under which members of the Party committee and office cadres take part in labor during such busy periods as "three-summer work," "three-shock operations," "three-autumn work" and in building large-scale water conservation projects. Organizational building of the Party and the League should be stepped up and fine elements drawn into these two bodies.

(4) Gradually improve the material and cultural life of the workers on the basis of developing production.

In accordance with Chairman Mao's teaching, "Be concerned with the livelihood of the masses," it is necessary to look at this question from the height of gradually narrowing the differences between town and country and to criticize the bourgeois and revisionist doctrines of welfare state. The workers' material life should be improved step by step in line with the policy of "developing the economy and insuring supplies," on the basis of developing industrial and farm production, and proceeding from "the viewpoint of making all-round arrangements for the whole people." We should act on Chairman Mao's instruction "Produce more grain and clothing by our own efforts," and do more things at less cost.

In the 1975-80 period, in the cultural field, taking into consideration the fact that the farm has more young people who are energetic and willing to study and work, we should fully mobilize the young people to build with their own hands reading rooms, table tennis rooms, television rooms, cultural and recreation activity rooms, basketball and volleyball courts for their companies as well as developing all kinds of popular cultural and sports activities on a small scale. The farm headquarters should set up a cultural palace and a library, establish a film projection team and a literary and art propaganda team, and build a central stadium including a football pitch with the school as the base. Primary and middle schools for workers' children should be managed well.

In the medical field, it is necessary to observe the policy of putting the stress on prevention and to actively launch a mass patriotic health campaign. By 1980, a number of common contagious diseases should be brought under control. Barefoot doctors groups should be further consolidated and developed. Medical allowances should be given to dependents of workers and the medical and health conditions should be improved.

Material life must be improved. Worker mess halls must be seriously managed. Starting from growing vegetables well and making use of "ten kinds of edges" everywhere, the variety and quantity of beans, bean products and vegetables should be increased. The standard of the diet

should be raised while the living costs should be lowered. To facilitate production and the livelihood of the masses, more commercial points should be set up or expanded in a rational manner. Such services as tailoring, hair-cutting and photography should be improved further.

The farm's plan covering the period between 1975 and 1980 has taken full account not only of the favorable conditions but also of the possible difficulties, and different concrete measures have been advanced for overcoming difficulties. Under the guidance of the Party's basic line, we are firmly convinced that given our diligent labor, the outlook of Ch'ienchin Farm "will change year after year. There will be a relatively big change every five years and a bigger change after several five-year periods."

III

"Socialism Is victoriously advancing everywhere, leaving behind it all stumbling blocks." Over the years, a heated debate has been carried out on the question of the state farm in our farm and in various strata of society. This fact shows that the socialist state farm has been publicly acknowledged to be an indispensable part of our economic life. It is in the violent contention between the two lines and two kinds of thinking that the state farm has been growing ever stronger. Now, the time has come for us workers of state farm to seriously state our viewpoint and to refute all kinds of erroneous viewpoints.

Des a farm under socialist state ownership have any superiority? This is a major question of principle bearing on whether Marxism can be applied to the operation of the state farm. It is an issue that must be clearly settled. Marking the National Day of 1974, the joint editorial of Jen-min Jih-pao, Hung-ch'i and Chieh-fang-chün Pao pointed out: "The struggle between socialism and capitalism in the economic sphere has not ended because of the basic victory we have won in the transformation of ownership." This is also the case with the operation of the state farm. Although our farm has been set up for more than a decade and has huge superiority and strong vitality because its economy is that of socialist state ownership, a small handful of class enemies have never stopped spreading the fallacy that "state ownership is no better than collective ownership and collective ownership is no better than individual ownership." They vainly attempted to deny the superiority of socialist state ownership, oppose taking the socialist road, and conspire to embark on the capitalist road. When making an analysis of China's state-owned economy long ago, Chairman Mao taught us: "This part of the economy is of socialist character, not of capitalist character. Whoever neglects or makes light of this makes the Right-deviating opportunist mistakes." Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao and other Right opportunists like them represent all those who vainly attempt to deny the superiority of socialist state ownership. As a matter of fact, the fallacy which negates the superiority of the state farm does not deserve our time in refuting it. Where it not for socialist state ownership, would it have been possible for us to build such a huge farm on a large tract of saline land. Would it have been possible for us to build on a tract of land measuring nearly 30,000 mow forest belts, strip fields, roads and a network of waterways and to achieve a rapid development of grain and cotton, with average per-mow output of

grain and ginned cotton growing annually by 20 and 10 percent respectively since 1970? Were it not for socialist state ownership, would it have been possible for us in the three years from 1971 to 1973 to provide the state with a continuing flow of laborers with socialist consciousness and a definite level of culture to participate in work on other fronts? Today, the number of such laborers supplied to the state is over 40 percent of the total number of workers now on the farm. Is it not true that with the number of new hands increased by a big margin on the farm, agricultural and industrial output has nevertheless risen, instead of decreasing? All these amply demonstrate the huge superiority of the state farm, a fact that no one can deny.

At one time in the past, the farm was run unsatisfactorily and its superiority was not brought into full play. The main reason for this, however, was that the operation of the farm was hampered by the revisionist lines of Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao and company; it was definitely not that Marxism or socialist state ownership did not work. When the state farm was interfered with by the revisionist line and the leading squad was weak, the superiority of the state farm could hardly be displayed. When the state farm was run under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the leading squad was reorganized and strengthened, it then became possible to beat back the offensive of capitalist forces, consolidate and develop the socialist state ownership, display fully the superiority of the state farm and run it well.

Many of our state farms were established in swampy areas and indeed met with numerous difficulties. But difficulties, however great, have never daunted the farm workers. "With the sun in our hearts, we have nothing to fear and pledge to turn the swamp areas into fertile fields." We have far more favorable conditions in relation to difficulties. We have the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, we have the huge superiority of socialist state ownership and the red hearts and hands of the farm workers, and we have aid from various quarters, trades and professions. There is no difficulty which cannot be surmounted by fully utilizing all these favorable conditions.

How should we measure the success of a state farm? This is also quite a controversial question. The bone of contention is whether to turn a state farm into an economic unit merely growing grain, cotton and oil-bearing crops or to insist on having it take the road as indicated by the "May 7" directive and, with agriculture as the foundation, undertake on an integrated basis agriculture, forestry, livestock breeding, sideline occupations and fishery as well as industry, commerce, education and military training, thereby turning the farm into not only a state-owned economic unit but also a great school fostering successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. We believe that in building a new socialist countryside and gradually reducing the three big differences in accordance with the spirit of the "May 7" directive, the state farm should be able to play an exemplary role by positively creating fresh experience. Our Ch'ienchin Farm and the various farms under the Shanghai municipal authority jointly undertake the glorious task of educating and bringing up the vast masses of educated youths and supplying them to the various fronts of the state.

This task will not be fulfilled if the farm is regarded only as a producer of grain, cotton and oil-bearing crops. Over the years our farm, on the basis of vigorously developing agriculture, has developed forestry, livestock breeding, sideline occupations and fishery. We have developed some industries in conformity with the demands of state plans, and the necessary personnel have also been trained. Only by adhering to the general policy of developing the national economy with agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor and by running the farm in accordance with the policy of taking grain as the key link for general development and along the road indicated by the "May 7" directive can we fulfill the requirements of a socialist state farm.

Can we run the state farm well by relying on the rusticated educated youths? This question has been heatedly debated both inside and outside the farm. Essentially the question is this: how should we view the principal aspect of the youths of the Mao Tsetung thought era?

Chairman Mao teaches us: "The young people are the most active and vital force in society. They are the most eager to learn and the least conservative in their thinking. This is especially so in the era of socialism." Like other farms of the whole city, our Ch'ienchin Farm takes the educated youths as the mainstay. Young people account for over 95 percent of the total number of the farm's workers. If we do not rely on such a large number of educated youths, can we operate the state farm well? Decidedly not. Beginning with 1968, large groups of young people have arrived at our farm each year. In line with Chairman Mao's instructions, they have firmly criticized the revisionist lines of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao through actual actions. Resisting certain erroneous public opinion, they have charged forward against the wind and waves. Our Second Forestry Company is a company composed of 287 youths. In 1970 they tried to grow cotton for the first time, advancing the resounding slogan "Stand erect and grow honor-winning fields and pledge to bring in a per-mow output of ginned cotton of 200 catties so as to deal a harsh blow to imperialism, revisionism and reaction." They said: "If the farm does not double its output, we won't eat or sleep well." With a high degree of consciousness of the line struggle, they humbly learned from the cotton experts of Nanhui hsien and worked intensively at each link of planting, field care and harvesting, overcoming one natural calamity after another. Finally they achieved a per-mow output of ginned cotton of 200 catties on a large piece of cotton land measuring 124 mow, and for several years in a row they preserved the honor as an advanced unit in cotton planting in Shanghai's suburbs. Our "May 7" Company is a newly formed company of young people. The nine cadres of the company are educated youths, with the average age of 24. In 1969, they led more than 300 educated youths who were younger to a piece of wasteland with the saline content of the soil amounting to as high as 0.5 percent to build up the company. For three consecutive years since 1971, they surpassed the "Program" targets for grain and cotton on the saline land, with per-mow output of grain exceeding a thousand catties in 1973. They are now an advanced unit of the farm. Our Fourth Company is also one with young people as the mainstay and is known as an "old advanced" on the farm. In 1973 its annual per-mow output of grain amounted

to 1,425 catties and that of ginned cotton to 162 catties. Today, among cadres at the farm and company levels, young cadres account for 78 percent. It is by depending on this new force full of vitality that we have been able to change the features in a short span of three to four years and win the first battle in doubling the output of the farm.

In the face of these facts, can those who refuse to believe that our educated youths are capable of running the farm well still stick to their views? Young people of the Mao Tsetung thought era are always good in the main. The broad masses of young people on our Ch'ienchin Farm will never let Chairman Mao down. They are determined to dedicate themselves to making revolution on the farm. They are willing to toil hard and, together with the 600,000 poor and lower-middle peasants of Ch'ungming hsien and workers of other brother farms, exert greater efforts to build the Ch'ungming Island -- the third largest island of the socialist mother country -- into a more beautiful and fertile island.

Finally, does one have good prospects in the rural areas? This question is raised commonly. Chairman Mao teaches us: "The countryside is a vast world where great possibilities are provided." Are there great, small or no prospects? Different classes have different answers. Our farm's young people, through their own practice, have come to understand better the complete correctness of Chairman Mao's instruction. We are growing up sturdily in this vast world. Many young people of the farm are now able to work in the fields or on the bench; they can take up guns to strike at the enemy and pens to criticize the bourgeoisie. They are marching forward along on the road toward overall development. But it cannot be denied that the ill wind of the exploiting class which looks at the countryside and agriculture with contempt still keeps on blowing into our farm from time to time. Lin Piao viciously attacked the settling down of the educated youths in the countryside as "labor reform in disguise." Such reactionary views had for one time poisoned some people. They asked: if people were required to undergo "reform through labor," what prospects could they have? As a matter of fact, "labor reform in disguise" was merely a modern version of Confucius' saying "one will go hungry by farming but get rich by learning." Those who despise the countryside and agriculture do not even bother to think of this: Without the countryside and agriculture they might as well be starved to death. They could think only because they are well fed! It is not strange for the exploiting class to entertain such ideas, because this is a reflection of its instinct to exploit the laboring people. But it is most erroneous for some of our comrades to have such notions. We must shout at them: "'Comrades,' what you say won't work. The proletariat cannot follow you. To follow you would actually means to follow the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and there would be the danger of the Party and the state perishing. Whom should we follow? We can only transform the Party and the world in the image of the vanguard of the proletariat." The young people of our farm must transform the countryside in the image of the vanguard of the proletariat and fight for building a new socialist countryside. Revolutionary parents, revolutionary teachers and all those who want revolution should encourage and support educated youths to be proletarian revolutionaries changing the world, and must not pull their legs.

The revolutionary youths of the Mao Tsetung thought era are critics of the old world and builders of the new. Young people of the farm, farm workers and cadres, let us, guided by Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, stand on the shore of the East China Sea and, as the sun is rising, use our diligent toil and brave struggle to gradually realize the lofty and ideal society of communism!

Ch'ienchin Farm must march forward! Forward, forward and forward!

* * *

Develop Production and Consolidate Political Power

-- After reading "On Salt and Iron"

by

Ching Ch'ih (景 池)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 20, 1974)

The conference on salt and iron during the middle Western Han period was a big debate in the theoretical, political and economic fields under the new class struggle situation involving the Confucianists and Legalists. This debate was initiated with a view to discussing the advantages and disadvantages of government monopolies of salt and iron and whether or not this measure should be abolished. Essentially the debate was a round of political struggle to consolidate the newly rising landlord class government or subvert it.

I

At the inception of the Western Han empire the newly emerging feudal regime was faced with the restorationist activities of the remnant forces of the slave owners in the Central Plain areas and the incursions into border areas by the Huns and slave-owning nobles of minority tribes. Adding havoc wrought by severe natural disasters, the resources of these areas derived from the produce of the land became insufficient. In calamity-stricken areas in particular, the people were deprived of their farming and other pursuits and as a result they suffered hunger. This serious situation was exploited by various reactionary forces which were examining the trends to make their bids successful. This was observed by Lou Ching, a high official of the Western Han imperial court, who said to Liu Pang: "Although Your Majesty has conquered the regions within the passes, you have few people. The barbarians are our neighbors and six states ruled by powerful clans are to the east. If rebellion should occur, Your Majesty would hardly sleep in peace." ("Lou Ching," Han Shu) Therefore among the pressing problems confronting the Western Han government was adoption of measures that would rapidly heal the wounds of wars, restore and develop social production and strengthen the economic powers of the state in order to consolidate its rule.

To consolidate his rule and take over Ch'in Shih Huang's Legalist line, Liu Pang took steps to strengthen landlord class dictatorship. This he did by ordering the compulsory transfer to areas adjacent to Changan of more than a hundred thousand people, including the descendents of the rulers and princes of various subdued ducal states and the former retainers of slave owners. On the other hand, he strengthened the system based on the centralization of state authority and decreed the vigorous development of agricultural production by taking advantage of the decline of the remnant forces of the slave owners as a result of peasant uprisings in the last year of the Ch'in empire. He also promulgated decrees exempting those of long military service from forced labor on government service and providing those

with merit with land and accommodation. Policies defining farming as the primary occupation and encouraging fugitives and slaves freed from bondage to reclaim wasteland and undertake farming at greatly reduced land taxes were enforced. In addition, those who had rendered meritorious services in agriculture and military campaigns were given honorary titles. During the reigns of Emperor Wen and Emperor Ching, farming was repeatedly decreed as the source of all important schemes and agriculture declared as the "primary undertaking" which "is to be pursued with vigor." Under the patronage of Legalist representatives at the time, such as Chia I and Ch'ao Ts'o, measures in favor of farming and planting mulberry trees and reducing land levies were put into effect. After decades of efforts social productive forces, spurred by the ever growing feudal relations of production, achieved quite significant development. This brought about improvement in the adverse economic situation and resulted in steady rises in grain reserves. The development of productive forces thus initially contributed to the stability of the otherwise chaotic Western Han empire after its rulers quelled the revolts of the feudal overlords and the rebellions of the seven ducal states including Wu and Ch'u.

However, the feudal relations of production, like all things, followed a course of inception, development and consolidation. Although the feudal relations of production during the middle Western Han period had already been established and attained development, they were far from consolidated. The vital industries of salt and iron in particular were still controlled by production relations based on the slave system or the same system in disguise. Representing these reactionary relations of production, slave owners in industry and commerce and the local secessionist forces, backed by their economic forces, vied with the central government of the Western Han. The situation which prevailed at that time was described by Sang Hung-yang and duly recorded in Fu Ku (復古, restoration of the old) as being the source of great wealth to private individuals or powerful clans who controlled them. Whether or not this reactionary force in the political and economic fields could be resisted posed a major issue having a bearing on whether or not the central government of the Western Han could be consolidated and the social productive forces further developed.

Being aware of this situation, Emperor Wu of Han adopted the correct views put forward by Legalist representatives like Sang Hung-yang and set up government monopolies in the vital industries of salt and iron throughout the empire. This transferred private ownership of salt and iron industries to government control. After more than 30 years of salt and iron monopolies the social economy achieved further development. Instead of widespread shortages of food as in the early Western Han period, ample supplies had been stored by the middle Han period, with the number of horses in the city of Changan reaching tens of thousands. On the basis of development of agricultural production, large-scale irrigation projects were completed by hundreds of thousands of civilian laborers who displayed the power and wisdom of the working people to overcome and change nature. The further development of production in turn contributed to the further consolidation of the newly rising landlord class regime. The central government during the reign of Emperor Wu of Han obtained from the salt and iron monopolies

immense profits and economic strength sufficient to maintain military forces, block annexation attempts, relieve stricken areas, put down revolts and splittist activities carried out by Prince Huai-nan and Prince Heng-shan at the time, strike telling blows at the slave owners in industry and commerce as well as local secessionist forces, repel on numerous occasions the incursions of the Huns and slave-owning nobles into the Central Plain, and thus consolidate the feudal regime of the Western Han. In this struggle the newly rising feudal rulers achieved the objective of developing production and consolidating their political power by objectively conforming to the demand for development of the social productive forces.

II

At the salt and iron conference held in 81 B.C., seven years after the death of Emperor Wu, a violent debate was unfolded between the Legalist officials and Confucian scholars. A group of Confucian literati and the worthy devotees of Confucius sprang out fiercely to attack the salt and iron monopolies. They claimed the government was entering into competition with the people and charged that the measure was "enriching the state but impoverishing the people." What was to be done then? They clamorously called for moves to "prevent evil and error at their source and increase the profitableness of agriculture, to broaden the beginnings of morality and open the way for the exercise of humanity and righteousness." They insisted that "never should material profit appear as a motive of government, and only then can moral instruction succeed and the customs of the people be reformed." ("The Proposal" and "Discussion on Gain") Here, the Confucianists were clearly espousing a line for the development of production that was opposed to the measure proposed by the Legalists.

The relationship between what is "primary" (本) and what is "secondary" (末) is one between farming and commerce and industry. In Chinese history how to handle this relationship was invariably linked with given relationships of the system of ownership. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods when the Legalists mounted the political stage, measures advancing primary pursuits and suppressing secondary ones were mooted to undermine the relations of production based on the slave system and prepare public opinion in favor of developing the relations of production based on the feudal system. The views advocated by Li K'uei, Shang Yang, Han Fei and Hsün K'uang all underlined measures designed to negate the ching-t'ien system based on the system of land ownership favored by the slave owners, an effective measure to develop the economy of the feudal landlords under the premise of wrecking the "well-field" system. The Legalists stressed the "primary" aspect of the feudal economy and suppressed the "secondary" occupations /trading/ under the control of the big slave owners in industry and commerce. Some people erroneously interpreted the "repressive" actions of the pre-Ch'in Legalists as being directed against industrial and commercial pursuits. Since the third social division of labor which identified the merchants as a parasitic class, big commerce (which then had incorporated the handicraft trade) had been under the control of the slave-owning nobles. If the newly rising feudal class did

not "suppress" the "secondary occupations" -- meaning the forces of the slaves owners in industry and commerce, its ascent would have been blocked. Since history kept advancing, the inception of the Western Han government was accompanied by the development of industry and trade, spurred by the development of agriculture. In "advancing primary pursuits and suppressing secondary ones," as was practiced by Emperor Wu and Sang Hung-yang, it meant that the slave owners in industry and commerce were not permitted to operate the vital industries of salt and iron that had a bearing on the national economy and the people's livelihood. The setting up of government monopolies in the vital industries of salt and iron and the establishing of government trading thus involved a revolution in the relations of production. In line with the principle of "adopting different measures in changing circumstances," Emperor Wu and Sang Hung-yang adapted the practice of the pre-Ch'in Legalists of "advancing the primary and suppressing the secondary" to pursuits that would "profitably integrate the primary with the secondary." This conformed to the requirement of consolidating the ascending relations of production and spurring the development of productive forces. At the debate on salt and iron the Confucian scholars clamorously claimed that "as the secondary occupations flourish, those that are primary suffer." This was just the opposite of what had been recommended by the pre-Ch'in Legalists. The Confucianists were referring to the salt and iron monopolies and not the secondary occupations under the control of the slave owners in industry and commerce. Praising the past and deprecating the present, they voiced approval of the reign of Emperor Wen of Han when salt and iron monopolies had not been set up. They spoke approvingly of sufficient wealth among the people in the absence of salt and iron monopolies and of the "poverty" of the people when state control of commerce and industry was introduced. They therefore could not bear this practice and insistently recommended that the salt and iron monopolies and the system of equitable marketing be abolished. They even recommended that "the division of the land into well fields" be restored. Clearly, they wanted to "advance" the "primary" based on the slave system and "suppress" the "secondary" (control of profits) based on the feudal economy. They wanted to "divide (split)" the land of the Western Han empire and "increase the profitableness" of "agriculture" based on the "well-field" system. To divide the land belonging to the state and restore the "well-field" system therefore embodied in a most fitting manner the Confucianists' interpretation of "advancing the primary and suppressing the secondary." This clearly signaled their approval of the slave system.

Outwardly this group of the worthies and learned men seemed concerned with the question of production when they advocated "advancing the primary and suppressing the secondary." In substance they aimed at restoring the slave system. Since production stems from relations of production under a given system of ownership, there is no such thing as production that is divorced from such relations. Therefore, the nature of production is determined by the political line which guides production. If the principle underlying what the Confucian scholars had recommended in the middle Western Han period, that is, "advancing the primary and suppressing the secondary," was followed, it would mean control of the vital salt and iron industries essential to the economic lifeblood of the

state by the slave owners in industry and commerce and the local secessionist forces. It would also mean a possibility of resuscitating the defunct "well-field" system. Sang Hung-yang pointed out the serious harm that could be brought about by the line espoused by the Confucian scholars. He declared, "Abolition of the salt and iron monopolies to please the powerful and satisfy their greed would foster partisanship and waywardness" and "would empty the treasuries and deplete the funds used for defense." Warning that the state would be in the grip of grave political and economic crises, he firmly repudiated the reactionary line of "dividing the land into well fields" at the debate on salt and iron. He declared that newly rising feudal states must "control profitable salt and iron industries and exclude rich merchants and big traders," stressing that "with sufficient food among the people there is no need for well fields." He recommended the line for developing the feudal economy that would "uproot the powerful" and "benefit both the primary and secondary pursuits," a correct line under the circumstances that prevailed at the time. Adoption of this line eventually resulted in the strengthening of the feudal relations of production, fostering of the development of productive forces and consolidation of the Western Han central government. After the debate on salt and iron, however, this line was altered and salt and iron monopolies abolished. In less than three years, the remnant forces of the slave owners in industry and commerce took advantage of the lucratic private salt and iron operations to rapidly increase their strength, resulting in a situation in which "primary matter is abandoned in favor of pursuing secondary matter, the tillers cannot plow half of their plots and the wrongdoers run amuck."

III

Lenin pointed out: "If a class politically does not correctly handle problems, it cannot maintain its rule; consequently, it will fail to resolve its production tasks." During the middle Western Han period the imperial court was faced with the problem of rebellion arising from the collusion between the Han slave owners and the Hun slave owners. To the Western Han government this was a matter of prime importance. In the early years of Emperor Wu's reign the iron and salt industries had been the source of great wealth to the Han slave owners in industry and commerce and the local secessionist forces which controlled them. They not only did not support the central government in quelling the revolts but instead provided the rebels with enormous material strength. Fighting at the borders then raged intermittently yet the rich merchants and big traders who had amassed great wealth through their lucratic salt and iron operations made no efforts to relieve the pressures on the imperial coffers. They even went so far as to collude with the slave-owning nobles among the Huns and conspired to overthrow the Western Han government. Because of the need for revenue to support defensive warfare against the Huns who were threatening the empire, Emperor Wu accepted Sang Hung-yang's proposal and transferred private salt and iron operations to government control. Without levying high taxes upon the people, sufficient funds were raised for the military expenditures in the borders. With funds assured, the troubles at the borders were quickly brought under control. "At one stroke," this caused "the Huns to tremble with fear."

At the debate on salt and iron, however, the worthies and learned men viciously attacked the Western Han central government for its military actions to protect the agricultural land in the Central Plain and insure stable farm yields. They also accused the government of waging wars that had caused the "border garrisons to suffer hunger and cold and increase the distress of the people." They demanded that "salt and iron monopolies and the system of equitable marketing be abolished." They advocated that "the rulers should practice benevolent government and then they will be invincible throughout the empire." If their recommendations were adopted the agricultural land in the Central Plain would be trampled upon by the iron hoofs of the Huns while the local secessionist forces would expand viciously to expose the Western Han, a state of centralized power under landlord class dictatorship, to the danger of collapse and restoration. Such recommendations thus embodied at the time a completely reactionary political line.

The debate on salt and iron between the Confucianists and the Legalists during the Western Han period objectively attests to this truth: Only by establishing and developing new relations of production can any newly rising class further develop production, strengthen its economic foundation and political strength, and further consolidate the newly acquired political power. All reactionary and decadent classes, such as those represented by the worthies and learned men, would betray their conspiratorial attempts to undermine the ascending relations of production and restore the reactionary relations of production once their clamors for development of production are divorced from given relations of production. Renegade and traitor Lin Piao likewise resorted to this approach. He insisted on the development of production after the close of the 9th Party Congress, for the purpose of inducing the proletariat to abandon politics and the struggle between socialism and capitalism in the economic sphere, and abandon continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship. What he called development of production was in effect intended to serve the political purpose of plotting the restoration of capitalism. Therefore, on the question of developing production we should be good at summing up the historical experience of the class and line struggles. With the dictatorship of the proletariat in command, we should consciously keep to the socialist road and develop the socialist economy with greater, faster, better and more economical results so as to attain the objective of continuously strengthening proletarian dictatorship.

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Read Wang Ch'ung's "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius"

by

Chai T'ing-chin (翟廷晋)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 20, 1974)

During the early Eastern Han period when Confucianism was predominant, Wang Ch'ung openly raised the fighting banner of "attacking Confucius" and "stabbing Mencius." He devoted decades of efforts to writing the book Lun-heng (论衡) or Critical Essays containing the brilliant chapters "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius." Aiming his barbs at Confucian Classics such as Confucian Analects and the Works of Mencius, Wang Ch'ung applied the method of formalistic logic to openly repudiate Confucius and Mencius and incisively reveal the pretense and reaction of Confucianism. Analyzing the militancy and limitations of "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius" with the Marxist viewpoint and summing up Wang Ch'ung's historical experience in the repudiation of Confucius would be helpful to our study of the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle and the unfolding of actual class and line struggles.

Wang Ch'ung (27-97 A.D.) lived in the Former Eastern Han period, at a time when Confucian arrogance was at its height. Since Tung Chung-shu deified Confucius with his proposal to "ostracize other schools of thought but respect only Confucianism" and his rubbish talk about "man's identity with Heaven," Confucian teachings which had been roundly castigated by Legalist critics began to prevail. In the last year of the Western Han the feudal rulers in order to free themselves from the plight caused by the peasant uprisings reversed the progressive tradition of honoring Legalism and opposing Confucianism that had been upheld from Liu Pang, founder of the Han empire to Emperor Hsuan of Han and turned to the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius for help. After the Eastern Han imperial court was established the feudal rulers continued to deify Confucius for the purpose of "proclaiming the theory of portents throughout the empire." As a result, prophetic writings such as the ch'an (讖) and the wei (纬) spread unchecked and Confucianism became the orthodox philosophy of the state. In deifying the feudal emperors through these prophetic writings, Confucius was described as a "prophet" who possessed intuitive knowledge of the future and exalted to the status of one who could "communicate with Heaven" and transmit the will of Providence. Some prophetic books preached that Providence had long ago told Confucius that Liu Pang was decreed by Heaven to establish the Han empire. For instance, in his writings Confucius had defined Han regulations and institutions. All such nonsense which was no better than crude fabrications was considered at that time as supremely authoritative. In Wang Ch'ung's time the reigning monarch was Emperor Chang of Han, who personally called a meeting at Paihukuan to dish up a compilation called Pai-hu T'ung-i (白虎通义).* This was an attempt to interpret the

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* See also "Comment on the Paihukuan Conference and 'Pai Hu T'ung," Hung-ch'i, No. 10, October 1, 1974. SPRCM No. 796, p. 83.

Confucian canon in terms of "man's union with Heaven" and the theory of portents which flourished at the time. This systematic deification of the Confucian canon was undertaken to serve the needs of the reactionary feudal power groups. Whoever at the time dared to challenge Confucius could be persecuted wilfully on the mere charge of "criticizing the sage with no regard for principle." In these circumstances whether or not one dared to oppose Confucius became the touchstone for determining whether or not one had the daring to vouch for progressiveness and demand reform.

When the Paihukuan meeting called by the supreme ruler of the Eastern Han was in session, materialist Wang Ch'ung in order to oppose the corrupt rule of the feudal and powerful forces put forward the militant slogan of "challenging Confucius" and attacking him according to Wang Ch'ung's methods of reasoning. This started fierce criticism of Confucius, venerable master of the Confucianists, and Mencius, his faithful devotee. The Confucianists at the time regarded the sayings of the worthy and the sages as above reproach and looked upon Confucius' rubbish talks as embodying inviolable and absolute truth. Wang Ch'ung, however, insisted on actual observation of facts, on "experimental proof." In his view, whether the "revelations" of Providence or Confucius' "sacred edicts" were correct or not should be verified by "facts." He meant that views that were in contravention of facts would invariably be debunked however glibly they were stated. The principle underlying his thesis was similar to the materialist theory of knowledge expounded by Legalist Han Fei. Although what Wang Ch'ung referred to as "facts" was different from what we mean practice, his method of reasoning to establish what he considered the truth of the matter and to oppose the idealist theory of transcendentalism upheld by the Confucianists was fraught with progressive significance in his day.

Since facts must be cited in proof of any correct or incorrect statements, then there is no such thing as born with knowledge. Wang Ch'ung used the materialist theory as an ideological weapon to tear up Confucius' robe of a "prophet." He bluntly pointed out that it was impossible for Confucius to be a "prophet" because his sight and hearing at the time of his birth were no different from those of the ordinary people. Apart from revealing the "falsehood" of the sayings attributed to Confucius in the chapter "Questioning Confucius," Wang Ch'ung in another chapter "Real Knowledge" lists 16 instances to debunk the fictions and falsehoods which flourished in his day about the "sage." For instance, he asks: "If Confucius had foreknowledge of what the people of K'uang would do to him he should have taken another route to avoid being attacked," and why then did he prefer to be trapped? It is true that those who called themselves "prophet" and "genius" were ridiculed in history. In the case of Confucius who regarded himself as a "prophet," he was driven from pillar to post in his time and finally found himself in a blind alley in history. Careerist and conspirator Lin Piao bragged about his "genius" with a "particularly keen" head, while Ch'en Po-ta boasted himself of his "wisdom" that "can wipe out a thousand years of folly." But one of the two crashed to his death in Mongolia's sandy mound during his hurried flig t to Soviet revisionism.

After Wang Ch'ung used the materialist viewpoint to knock off the sacred halo of Confucius the "prophet," he proceeded to smash another trump card held in the hands of Confucian and Mencian followers and devotees, that is, the "theory of Heavenly mandate." This mystic theory embodying the theoretical program of "restraining oneself and returning to propriety" preached by Confucius and Mencius was at the core of the theory of portents in Wang Ch'ung's time. In the chapters "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius" as well as many other chapters in his Lun-heng, Wang Ch'ung never lost sight of repudiating this focal issue pertaining to the "theory of Heavenly mandate." This combined in fact the repudiation of Confucius with that of Tung Chung-shu and criticism of the "theory of Heavenly mandate" with that of the theory of portents, thereby striking telling blows at the reactionary trend of thought of revering Confucianism and opposing Legalism which flourished at that time.

The falsehood of the theory of Heavenly mandate preached by Confucius and Mencius was time and again debunked by Wang Ch'ung in the chapters "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius." For instance:

On one occasion Confucius looked **with disfavor upon** Tzu Kung's preoccupation with business to the neglect of the arrangements decreed by Heaven. He, however, mentioned the great wealth amassed by Tzu Kung through his mastery of figures. Wang Ch'ung argued that Confucius' references to honors and riches as being dependent on the will of Heaven and to make use of one's wisdom to get rich quick showed that he was contradicting himself. Wang Ch'ung also noted that Confucius on the one hand was critical of Tzu Kung for not accepting the arrangements decreed by Heaven but devoting himself to the pursuit of riches and honors and, on the other, he himself traveled from one state to another in quest of high office and enormous wealth. Wasn't Confucius saying one thing and doing quite another thing?

On another occasion Confucius called on Nan Tzu, wife of Duke Ling of Wei. This displeased Tzu Lu. Confucius promptly swore before Tzu Lu that nothing improper was involved and that if there was Heaven would punish him. Mockingly Wang Ch'ung reviled Confucius for his failure to cite facts in proof of his integrity when his behavior had aroused Tzu Lu's suspicion. He condemned Confucius and called him a "vulgar person" for invoking Providence. This deliberate disparagement of the prominent "sage," however, showed that Wang Ch'ung had not grasped the essence of the question from the line. As a matter of fact, Confucius was far from "vulgar" because his predicament stemmed from counter-revolutionary political considerations. The purpose of his calling on Duke Ling and his wife, whom he himself had despised, was after high office in the state of Wei through "internal connections" so he could make use of the ducal state to restore Chou ritual. Therefore, despite denunciations he didn't bother about kowtowing. In other words, this means the end justifies the means.

Mencius took a step further. He elaborated on Confucius' mystic theory of Heavenly mandate and advocated with vigor that the right to rule was bestowed by shen (神) or Supreme Ruler. He claimed that "in the

course of 500 years a true ruler should arise." In the chapter "Stabbing Mencius," Wang Ch'ung points out Mencius' errors in theory and confusion in logic, contending that Mencius' assertion was in contravention of facts recorded in history -- the ancient rulers such as Yao, Shun and Yü succeeded one after another and not after 500 years. Wang Ch'ung further debunked Mencius' claim by pointing out that no sage-kings had arisen during the 700 years from the early Chou to Mencius' time. He also contended that Mencius had no factual basis to support what he said about Heaven purposely sending down sages to this world. His wild assertions, in Wang Ch'ung's view, made Mencius no better than the so-called "vulgar Confucianists," that is, devotees of the "man's identity with Heaven" theory and the theory of portents. By linking these people with Confucius and Mencius, Wang Ch'ung implied that Confucius and Mencius were the venerable masters of this bunch of "vulgar Confucianists." Tung Chung-shu, for instance, inherited and elaborated on the mystic theory of Heavenly mandate of Confucius and Mencius. On the basis of the cyclical theory of "Heaven's Way," he conceived the reactionary conception of history which claimed that the Han Dynasty was in direct succession to the Chou Dynasty. What was expounded in the wei books and Pai-hu T'ung-i echoed the same tune as that of Tung Chung-shu, their common ground being contempt for the Ch'in empire which had unified China and set up a state of centralized power. Their denial of the historical fact that "Han inherited the Ch'in institution" showed their hatred for Ch'in Shih Huang, who was firm in implementing the Legalist line and achieved merits in Chinese history. They deserved to be called direct descendents of Confucian and Mencian followers.

"Prophet" and "Heavenly mandate" aside, these were but the masks of political swindlers like Confucian and Mencian devotees. Both Confucius and Mencius, careerists who did their best to restore the slave system, were double-dealers and pretenders who said nice things all the time but perpetrated misdeeds whenever they could. On the question of viewing "righteousness" and "gain," for instance, both Confucius and Mencius were clearly no better than those who sought nothing but personal gain. Yet verbally they repeatedly preached "righteousness" and objected to mentioning "gain." Confucius said, "The superior man seeks righteousness and the mean man seeks gain." He also said, "Riches and honors without regard for righteousness to me are like drifting clouds." Superficially, he appeared to be above the herd and separated from worldly concerns. Actually how did they behave? Wang Ch'ung had this to reveal:

On one occasion Kungshan Fu of the state of Lu occupied the Fei stronghold and betrayed the House of Chi. He dispatched someone to ask for Confucius' help. He was anxious to make a try and was all set to go there. However, Tzu Lu objected. Confucius said, "If he employs me with confidence, I can revive the best period of Western Chou in the east." On another occasion, Fo Hsi of the state of Tsin took Chungmou to rebel against Chao Chien-tzu. He also asked for Confucius' help. He was again ready to go but Tzu Lu again objected. He reminded Confucius of having said that the superior man should not be in the company of the wrongdoers. Confucius had to admit to having said so. But he drifted to another subject and said, "Should I be hung up like a gourd for decorative purposes and not eat

anything at all?" This shows that Confucius was so anxious to obtain a remunerative official post that he did not bother about what kind of people to turn to. Wang Ch'ung questioned Confucius: Since you have bragged about giving up ill-gotten riches and honors and regarded such as drifting clouds, why then do you serve a rebel minister against your own "faith" and accept his remuneration? Although Wang Ch'ung had not discerned Confucius' reactionary essence, he did uncover Confucius' hypocritical features.

On another occasion, Confucius said to Tzu Kung: "With sufficient food and sufficient military equipment, the confidence of the people in their ruler can be established." At first sight Confucius appeared to have emphasized both gain and righteousness without setting one against the other. However, when Tzu Kung pressed Confucius for more details, he let the cat out of the bag. If it cannot be helped, Tzu Kung asked, which of the three -- sufficient food, sufficient military equipment and confidence of the people in their ruler -- should be foregone first? Part with the military equipment and then abandon the food but confidence must never be dispensed with, Confucius replied, adding: "From the old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the state." Wang Ch'ung asked, "How can there be standing for the state where the starving people, without food, abandon the rules of propriety and public duty?" Although Wang Ch'ung's point of view did not explain the implications of the problem in correct perspective his attempts to uncover the falsehoods of Confucius and Mencius in their teachings by means of formalistic logic were of constructive significance.

Mencius took over what Confucius had preached since he viewed right conduct and personal gain as criteria distinguishing the noble from base. He told King Hui of Liang, "I am likewise provided with counsels to benevolence and righteousness so why must you use that word 'profit'?" He implied that the superior man should only be concerned with right conduct and not with personal gain. Wang Ch'ung alleged that Mencius had accepted gifts of gold from both King of Sung and Prince Hsüeh. This inexorable fact debunked Mencius' falsehood and deceit.

The hypocrisy and deceit of Confucius and Mencius in the name of honesty and integrity with which the two tried to conceal their greed became the magic of Confucianists in later generations with which they deceived the world and aspired to prominence by fraudulent means. To seek high office, Tung Chung-shu applied himself to the study of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius even to the point of "not looking over his garden for three years," in the hope that someday he would rise to fame. But on his lips he insisted on seeking "edification" and "enlightenment" "without caring for gain and merit." Reactionary Confucianists during the reign of Emperor Chao of Han did not hesitate to undermine the system based on the centralization of state power and secretly plotted surrender and national betrayal in order to uphold the selfish gains of slave owners in industry and commerce as well as local despots. However, they unfurled the banner of "stressing moral virtues rather than profit" to oppose government monopolies in salt and iron and accused Legalist Sang Hung-yang of "competing

with the people for profit." In their view, the "people" referred to the handful of the remnants of slave owners and feudal secessionist forces. They were exactly those who "verbally oppose utilitarianism but actually are pretenders aspiring to the most selfish and short-sighted utilitarianism."

Renegade and traitor Lin Piao was likewise a Confucius-type hypocrite. To restore capitalism and establish the Lin family fascist dynasty, he had set his mind on usurpation of the Party and seizure of power. Being power-crazy, he was patently a big careerist blinded by gain. Yet he pretended to give the impression that he was ready at any time to "abdicate in favor of the worthy." How utterly shameless he was! On the one hand he disguised himself as a "Communist" and accused the toiling masses of "seeking ways and means to obtain money and rice" and, on the other, he claimed "there is a big difference" between what concerned himself and what concerned the workers and peasants. This was in fact a copy of Confucius' teaching: "The mind of the superior man is concerned with righteousness but the mind of the inferior man is filled with gain." Was he really unconcerned with "gain"? Not at all, because he had always dreamed about "multiplying gains" such as usurping the Party and the state, restoring capitalism and setting up a feudal fascist dynasty of the Lin family.

On the other hand, in the chapters "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius" Wang Ch'ung cited innumerable statements and acts attributed to both Confucius and Mencius to pitilessly uncover and bitingly revile, by means of formalistic logic, their contradictory preachings and inconsistent behavior. This graphically unmasked the so-called "supreme sage" and "lesser sage" as uneducated good-for-nothing and reactionary politicians wandering here and there to deceive people.

Wang Ch'ung's open aversion to Confucianism was consistent with his Legalist stand. However, due to class and historical limitations Wang Ch'ung was far from thoroughgoing in his opposition to Confucian teachings. His book Lun-heng is full of contradictions. For instance, on the one hand he is bold in affirming the meritorious contributions of Legalist Shang Yang and Ch'in Shih Huang to history and, on the other, is critical of Han Fei, who synthesized all the previous teachings of the Legalist thinkers. While on the one hand he repudiates the idealist theory of Heavenly mandate and theism from the materialist and atheist standpoint, on the other he is led by his method of reasoning into the quagmire of fatalism. Even in the chapters "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius," he has failed to grasp the essence of the line question and touch on what underlies phenomenon when taking the teachings of Confucius and Mencius to task.

The embodiment of such contradictory manifestations in the person of Wang Ch'ung, a materialist and progressive thinker, can only be correctly interpreted with the Marxist viewpoint. The reason why he had the daring to denounce Confucius, venerable master of the Confucian school of thought, and repudiate his teachings is that this was dictated by the needs of the landlord class reformists in their struggle against the diehards of the

feudal and powerful cliques during the Eastern Han period. His castigations of Confucius and Mencius symbolized the political attitude of a particular social force, that is, a force representative of the opposition of the progressive reformists at the time to the corrupt rule of the stubborn, conservative and powerful forces. As early as the latter Western Han period the intensification of the crisis gripping the landlord class rule as a result of the disruptive peasant uprisings forced the ruling classes themselves to undergo a series of disintegration. Consequently, a number of people were thrown out of the top and middle echelons of the pyramidal feudal hierarchy. Wang Ch'ung's family epitomized such changes. His ancestors for generations had rendered meritorious services to the Han empire in the military field and in recognition of their merits were accorded definitive social status. However, they were excluded by powerful clans and not long afterward were reduced to families of no consequence. Later, they had to make a living by growing mulberry trees and operating as merchants. Wang Ch'ung was therefore dissatisfied with the oligarchic rule of the upper strata of the landlord class. His access to the broad masses at the lower social strata to a certain extent won him public support in his struggles against the powerful clans. This encouraged him to get tough with the ruling classes and explains why he maintained a critical spirit in his daring approaches. As a landlord class statesman, however, Wang Ch'ung had invariably been concerned with the collapse of the entire feudal system. On the one hand he had to oppose the conservative diehards among the landlord class and, on the other, he was close to the peasants who had insisted on the overthrow of the feudal rule. In his struggle against Confucianism, he therefore often demonstrated complex contradictions such as his repudiation of the Confucian teachings and his lack of comprehension of the uncompromising spirit maintained by the Legalist forerunners in their anti-Confucian struggles. In addition to the chapters "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius," Wang Ch'ung wrote another chapter critical of Han Fei. In this chapter he disagreed with Han Fei who "attached importance to agriculture and war but deprecated the Confucian scholars" and his attempt to identify Confucianism as the first of the "five vermin." In combating the mystic theory of Heavenly mandate which flourished in his day, Wang Ch'ung refuted "man's identity with Heaven" and the theory of portents through his repudiation of the Heavenly mandate theory preached by Confucius and Mencius. But he failed to subscribe to the idea that the newly rising landlord class during the power-seizing stage had been obsessed by the notion that man's determination could prevail over Heaven's will. He viewed the natural order as being spontaneous and denied that man could possibly influence by his actions the order and harmony of the natural world. In this sense he negated the role of man's subjective initiative and became a believer in fatalism. Comparing with the spirit of progressiveness displayed by Hsün K'uang and Han Fei, Wang Ch'ung appeared to have regressed. Therefore, his repudiation of the Heavenly mandate theory was keyed to formalistic logic rather than attuned to the line struggle.

Reading the chapters "Questioning Confucius" and "Stabbing Mencius" by Wang Ch'ung can help us understand that without the use of the dialectical materialist theory and the theory of historical materialism as a sharp weapon

it would be impossible to completely curb the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. When we study the works of the Legalists and progressive thinkers in history, we do so for the purpose of assimilating the historical experience of previous anti-Confucian struggles. And in order to completely nullify the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, we must use Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tsetung thought as weapons. Only by doing so can we make the past serve the present and make the study of the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle better serve the actual struggles during the period of socialist revolution, serve the cause of opposing and preventing revisionism, and serve the consolidation of proletarian dictatorship.

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On the Laiwu Campaign

by

Shih Feng (史锋)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 20, 1974)

The Laiwu campaign is a renowned mobile war of annihilation fought by our Eastern China Field Army in the Laiwu area, Shantung, in early 1947 under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee. This campaign is a brilliant battle example in which our troops, following Chairman Mao's strategy and tactics, concentrated an absolutely superior force, marched forward and retreated in big strides, and wiped out large numbers of the enemy when they were on the move. At that time, the Chiang bandit troops were launching massive fierce attacks against our liberated area in Shantung both from the south and from the north. Our troops kept away from strong enemy units and attacked the weak ones, and concentrated our forces to attack the enemy's weak links. We used one column and one division to hold at bay the enemy's eight reorganized divisions (armies) attacking from the south and concentrated eight columns of the field army in hope of wiping out the three armies of the Li Hsien-chou army group on the north. The battle began on February 20 and ended on February 23 with over 56,000 enemy troops wiped out. In this Laiwu campaign, our troops, fighting both in the south and in the north, vividly and concretely demonstrated Chairman Mao's proletarian military concepts. An analysis of this campaign is of great significance to our study of Chairman Mao's military writings and to our criticism of Lin Piao's bourgeois military line.

Take the Initiative To Lure the Enemy in Deep, Create Favorable Opportunities for Fighting

The Laiwu campaign took place during the strategic defense stage of the People's War of Liberation. Let us first give an account of the background of this campaign.

In June 1946, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries impudently unleashed a nationwide civil war against nationwide opposition. When the war began, the enemy deployed in the Eastern China theater one-third of his forces for attacking the liberated areas throughout the country, that is, 62 brigades (divisions) consisting of 500,000 regular troops. The enemy intended to take advantage of his temporary military superiority to quickly invade and occupy our liberated areas and wipe out or expel our army.

Facing this bunch of the enemy troops that enjoyed a temporary military superiority, our troops followed Chairman Mao's strategic principle of active defense and persisted in interior-line operations strategically and in exterior-line operations in individual battles. At that time, the total strength of our troops in the Eastern China theater was 420,000 men, of whom 130,000 belonged to the field army. Our troops first launched attacks against the invading enemy troops in central Kiangsu, north

south of the Huai River, along the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway and in southern Shantung, dealing blows to the advancing enemy troops and gaining certain new experience in fighting. Then, we wiped out three enemy reorganized divisions in Supei and southern Shantung, dealing the invading enemy a heavy blow. As of January 1947, nearly 200,000 enemy troops had been wiped out. Nationwide, the enemy's all-out attack was close to total collapse. At this moment, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee, on the basis of the prevailing situation, set the fighting task to "wipe out another 40 to 50 Chiang's brigades in the next few months" and instructed our troops in the Eastern China theater to wipe out another ten brigades in one and half a month to two months. The Laiwu campaign was a mobile war of annihilation conducted in accordance with the above Chairman Mao's strategic dispositions under such a situation.

Chairman Mao pointed out: "To win victory in strategic defense, the fundamental thing is to concentrate our forces." On the eve of the Laiwu campaign, all our troops in Eastern China underwent unified reorganization on order of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee. The Eastern China Field Army was formally set up to directly command eleven infantry columns and one special force column with a total of 270,000 men. There were also 300,000 local troops. All the troops were under a strictly unified and centralized command and the leading organ of the field army, therefore, had at its disposal a huge main force, thereby insuring the planning and execution of a large-scale mobile war. After the conclusion of the southern Shantung campaign in early January 1947, the entire main force of the Eastern China Field Army was concentrated in areas surrounding Lin-i, the central city of the liberated area in Shantung, and regrouped and had a good rest during the interval between two campaigns. The entire army studied Chairman Mao's military thinking in relation with war practice, underwent battle training, and strengthened its sense of organization and discipline and unified leadership, thereby further improving and enhancing its fighting capability.

Upon learning from intelligence sources that our main force was massing in the Lin-i area, Chiang Kai-shek thought that our forces would surely defend Lin-i at all costs because it was the capital city of the liberated areas in Shantung. Thus, he hastily prepared the so-called operation plan of the "southern Shantung campaign" and assembled a large force composed of 23 reorganized divisions (armies) and 53 brigades (divisions) in a vain attempt to engage our forces in a "decisive battle" in the Lin-i area. All these units were Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted troops and more than half of them were positioned on the first line of attack. Ch'en Ch'eng, chief of the general staff of the Chiang bandit armed forces, was on hand in Hsüchou to personally direct this offensive. He clamored that "the survival of the Party and State hinges solely on the success of the southern Shantung campaign." Chiang Kai-shek also flew to Hsüchou to give Ch'en Ch'eng personal instructions. With Lin-i and Mengyin as targets, the enemy attacked the positions of our forces both from the south and north. The main storm group of the southern front comprised eight reorganized divisions and 20 brigades commanded by Ou Chen, commander of the 19th reorganized division. It advanced northward toward Lin-i in

th ee routes from T'aierhchuang, Hsinanchen and Ch'ent'ou. The auxiliary storm group on the northern front comprised three armies and nine divisions commanded by Li Hsien-chou, deputy commander of the 2nd pacification zone under the Hsüchou pacification command. It advanced toward the south from Mingshui, Tzuch'uan and Poshan via Laiwu and Hsint'ai with the aim of occupying Mengyin by surprise, thereby destroying our rear area bases to facilitate the offensive from the south. The enemy looked really awe-inspiring and arrogant and nothing seemed to stand in his way.

Faced with the enemy's attempt and troop disposition to attack Lin-i, Chairman Mao and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee cabled the East China Field Army on January 28, 1947 the following instruction: The offensive directed personally by Ch'en Ch'eng will be launched in the near future. It seems that it would be most advantageous for our forces to wait and engage the enemy when he attacks. By so doing, first, it will provide our forces with plenty of time for rest and consolidation; second, we can engage the enemy while he has not yet established a firm foothold; and third, we will be able to fight a sustained battle to wipe out most enemy troops. Then, on January 31, another instruction was cabled: Chiang's forces will attack within a few days. The situation seems favorable to our forces to wipe out large numbers of enemy troops during field operations. Our forces should lure the enemy troops deep into our territory and should not take action prematurely. On February 4 Chairman Mao and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee again cabled our forces the following instruction: The deeper the enemy penetrates, the better; the longer we delay engaging the enemy, the better. If we do not seek quick results and are ready to abandon Lin-i when necessary, we are sure to win the battle. The present strategy of the enemy is to lure our forces into attacking them first, thus exhausting our forces and then solidly taking Lin-i. You must not fall into the trap. Chairman Mao's instructions embodied the important strategic concepts of "luring the enemy in deep" and "defeating the enemy by delayed action." These concepts were basic guarantees for our victory in the Laiwu campaign.

Judging by the battlefield situation at that time, the enemy on the southern front, learning the lessons from the Supei and southern Shantung campaigns, adopted the tactics of "concentrating forc s, fighting steadily while securing solid positions, advancing abreast with other forces, and avoiding the situation when one column advances far ahead of others," thus driving forward slowly and carefully. Various attempts made by our army to lure an attacking enemy column to advance far ahead of the other columns had not succeeded. In addition, the enemy forces were concentrated and difficult to split. Therefore, few opportunities were available for our forces to engage the enemy with advantage. But the concentration of our main force in the vicinity of Lin-i had the effect of luring the enemy troops along the northern front into moving south all by themselves. Having noticed that our main force had moved south, the enemy troops along the northern front immediately moved south to the central part of our liberated areas in central Shantung. The enemy's advance contingent arrived in Laiwu on February 4. The strength of this isolated army was widely scattered when it thrust deeply into our liberated areas. With the exception of

one army which was directly under the control of the Chiang Kai-shek faction, the two other armies of the enemy force originally belonged to the Kwangsi faction and the northeast army. There were serious contradictions within the army force. Should our troops suddenly move north and wipe out the enemy force unexpectedly, we would not only smash the enemy's plan to attack our army from south and north simultaneously, but also would be able to attack the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway to establish closer links among the three revolutionary bases of Luchung (central Shantung), Chiaotung and Pohai and consolidate our rear areas. Then, with our troops recuperated and regrouped, we would also be able to wait for the enemy and gain complete initiative in taking our own time to attack the enemy on the southern front.

At this crucial moment in the development of the campaign, Chairman Mao instructed our army to resolutely move north to wipe out the enemy troops. He also instructed our army to regroup where it was in one week to ten days and to pretend to attack the enemy troops along the southern front with concentrated forces, so as to lure the enemy of the northern front into moving south and deep into Laiwu and Hsint'ai. Then the whole army should move out secretly to wipe out the Li Hsien-chou army group and attack and take the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway. This instruction of Chairman Mao's expeditiously grasped the opportunity of operation to our advantage, provided our army with an important decision on the Laiwu campaign and also pointed out the correct orientation in winning the victory in this campaign.

To Run Away Is To Fight Better, and To Fight It Is Necessary To Run Away

After deciding to take advantage of the psychology of the enemy along the southern front who was anxious to fight a decisive battle with the main force of our army, the East China Field Army, acting on Chairman Mao's instruction, ordered its main force to immediately move north in a covert way, and deployed our second and third columns in areas south of Lin-i in such a way as if they were prepared to fight a "decisive battle" and to confuse the enemy by waging battles of interception from time to time. All this was aimed at making the enemy mistake our second and third columns for the entire main force of our army and so luring the enemy of the northern front to move south without fear. To convince the enemy, a remarkable plan of "making a feint to the east while attacking in the west" was mapped out by our army, that is, simultaneously with the secret advance of our main force to the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, local armed forces were mobilized to drive toward Yenchou along the Tientsin-Pukou railway. Meanwhile, bridges were built across the canal in west Shantung to create a false impression that our army was about to cross the canal in west Shantung so as to conceal the real intention of our army. On the night of February 10, dividing into three groups and marching north day and night, the main force of our army secretly moved toward the Laiwu area, starting the prelude of the Laiwu campaign.

Taking Chairman Mao's instruction "make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective" as a guiding principle for combat, our army decided to abandon Lin-i while ordering the main force to move north. This decision played a very important role in winning the Laiwu campaign. Chairman Mao pointed out: "To achieve the goal of wiping out the enemy with concentrated forces and making the main force of our army avoid serious blows from enemy troops so as to rest and regroup for new battle, it is permissible to abandon some places under certain circumstances. As long as our army can sap much of the enemy's effective strength, it is possible to recapture the land we have lost and seize new places." Our army's decision to temporarily abandon Lin-i was for the purpose of destroying a vast part of the enemy's effective strength. The enemy, thinking that we would defend Lin-i, concentrated large numbers of troops in the vicinity of Lin-i in preparation for a decisive battle with our main force. Our decision to abandon Lin-i and avoid disadvantageous decisive battles caused the enemy troops to be motionless. On the other hand, however, our army succeeded in mobilizing its own main force at a faster pace and concentrating all troops to the fullest extent in the Laiwu area, creating decisive conditions for annihilating the entire enemy force on the northern front.

The clear-cut decision of our army to abandon Lin-i and to move north to wipe out the army group under the command of Li Hsien-chou was made on the basis of Chairman Mao's concept on mobile warfare. Mobility represents a basic characteristic of mobile warfare. The principle of mobile warfare demands that field armies advance or withdraw fast. In abandoning Lin-i and moving north to Laiwu, our army had precisely implemented Chairman Mao's mobile warfare principle "fight when you can win, move away when you cannot." Refusing to fight when you can win is opportunism, whereas fighting recklessly when you cannot win is adventurism. All our "moving" was for the purpose of "fighting." Our decision not to fight in Lin-i but move toward the Laiwu area was for the purpose of achieving still better results in fighting. This kind of "moving," which is seemingly passive and retrograde but is actually active and progressive, represents an indispensable step in wiping out the enemy.

During its drive toward the north, our army adopted the method of making arrangements and preparations and carrying out mobilization and also seized moments to call various meetings of cadres and companies to convey the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee on abandoning Lin-i and moving north to wipe out the enemy, thereby further educating the whole army with Chairman Mao's concept on mobile warfare. "All our 'moving' is for the purpose of 'fighting,' and all our strategy and tactics are built on 'fighting'." However, "there is no military expert anywhere in the world who approves only of fighting and never of moving." Under certain circumstances, "we are prepared to move away; such moving away is both permissible and necessary." By virtue of studying Chairman Mao's teachings in light of the experiences gained from many previous mobile battles, the masses of commanders and fighters got a better understanding of the dialectical relations between

mobile warfare and annihilation of the enemy and between moving away and winning battles. As a result, everyone became clear-minded and vigorous. Despite the cold weather, the troops marched a hundred li a day, departing in the evening and camping in early morning. Their fighting spirit kept soaring higher and higher.

"The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people." To cope with the needs of our army in fighting south and north to wipe out the enemy, the Party, government and mass organizations in all parts of Shantung immediately took necessary measures in accordance with the operational arrangements of our army. Aside from instructing the local governments in all parts of central Shantung to provide the troops in their own localities with grain, firewood and fodder and to mobilize the masses to work day and night to grind wheat, thresh rice, cook food cakes and repair shoes and mend socks for the troops, efforts were also made to send litter units, transport units and field hospital personnel to move north together with the army. The local armed forces and militia in central Shantung harassed the enemy day and night by waging guerrilla warfare and land-mine warfare, acting as guides for the troops, scouting for the troops, and maintaining a news blackout. They did a good job in helping the field army to move north secretly and smoothly. The people, men and women, old and young, in every hilly area and village throughout central Shantung, all participated in the upsurge of supporting the front. The people's support and supply of food, fodder and ammunition were always available to our troops wherever they went. What a magnificent picture of people's war this is!

After our main force moved north, the enemy on the southern front crawled into Lin-i on February 15. However, the northward movement of the main force of our army was discovered by Wang Yao-wu, commander of the Second Pacification Zone of the enemy whose headquarters was located in Tsinan. He was not only afraid of the possible annihilation by our army of Li Hsien-chou's army group, an isolated army which thrust deeply into our liberated areas, but also worried about the weak military force in Tsinan. Therefore, on February 16, he ordered a complete withdrawl of Li Hsien-chou's army group from the frontline, pulled back the 46th Army from Hsint'ai to Yenchuang, withdrew the 73rd Army and Li Hsien-chou's headquarters from Yenchuang to Laiwu, and also pulled back the new 36th Division of the 12th Army from Mengyin to Tussukou while its main force withdrew to Mingshui. But based on battle reports fabricated by their subordinates, Chiang Kai-shek and Ch'en Ch'eng clamored that "16 brigades of the Communist Army were wiped out on the Lin-i perimeter." When they received information from air reconnaissance that some units of our army were moving west and building bridges crossing the canal, they mistakenly believed that the withdrawal of our army from Lin-i was due to "heavy casualties and its loss of ability to continue fighting" and that our army might "escape" to areas north of the Yellow River. Therefore, strict orders were issued to Wang Yao-wu and Li Hsien-chou to move south again so as to protect Hsint'ai and Laiwu. On February 17 Wang Yao-wu again ordered the 46th Army to recapture Hsint'ai and the 193rd Division of the 73rd Army to occupy Yenchuang for the second time. The order issued by Chiang Kai-shek was a death warrant for the 50,000 to 60,000 Chiang's troops on the northern front. They were just

about to turn tail when these orders from Chiang Kai-shek sent them back to the gate of hell. Chiang Kai-shek had no idea then that he was falling into our trap of "making a feint to the east while attacking in the west." At this time, our main force was pushing toward Li Hsien-chou's army group. Now the enemy troops on the northern front could no longer escape their fate of total annihilation.

Complete Encirclement for Total Annihilation

While Li Hsien-chou's army group was pulling back, our army held firm to the decision of not alerting the enemy before our main force was assembled. Our troops had orders to move unnoticed to designated places for concentration of the main force to form a complete encirclement against the enemy forces and wipe them out. "Concentration of forces and employment of encircling and outflanking tactics are necessary conditions for mobile warfare and decisive offensives on the exterior lines." The great patience exercised by our army in not alerting the enemy before the main force was amassed and in not making any hasty moves was a major guarantee for wiping out the enemy during the Laiwu campaign.

When Li Hsien-chou's army group moved south for the second time and reached the vicinity of Hsint'ai, we were ready for combat. We quickly pressed toward the areas east and west of Laiwu. On February 19, our main force had completed the siege of the enemy. Only then did Ch'en Ch'eng and Wang Yao-wu realize what we were up to. To rescue Li Hsien-chou's army group from annihilation, Ch'en Ch'eng hastily ordered it to withdraw into Laiwu. He also ordered the 46th Army at Hsint'ai to retreat north to Yenchuang at night, the 193rd Division to retreat from Yenchuang to Laiwu to stay close to the 73rd Army, and the 77th Division of the 73rd Army at Poshan to quickly return southward to its parent army in Laiwu. However, it was already too late for the enemy to shake off our encirclement. Our forces were then swooping down on Laiwu from all directions. We made the following troop dispositions to counter the enemy withdrawals: the 8th and 9th Columns were to ambush the enemy 77th Division between Poshan and Laiwu; the 6th Column was to attack Tussukou and the new 36th Division deployed to its north; the 10th Column and the independent division under its command were to capture Chinyangkuan and to intercept possible enemy reinforcements moving southward from Mingshui; the 1st Column (reinforced by a division from the 8th Column) was to strike at the headquarters of Li Hsien-chou and of the 73rd Army and its 15th Division; the 4th Column was to attack and wipe out the 193rd Division at Yenchuang and, in case that division should retreat into Laiwu, to join the 1st Column in storming Laiwu; the 7th Column was to cut off the enemy 46th Army from its contact with Laiwu and also to serve as a general reserve force for the Laiwu campaign; and the main force of the 2nd Column, which was then tying down the enemy on the southern front, was to move northward to join the battle. The stage was set for a massive assault on Li Hsien-chou's army group.

Wipe Out the Enemy Forces One by One While They Were on the Run

The famous Laiwu campaign formally began when we laid siege to the enemy 77th Division in order to wipe it out. Before dawn on February 20, our 8th and 9th Columns moved into Hochuang and Putung areas on the flank. Hochuang was more than 30 li south of Poshan township and more than 60 li north of Laiwu city. It was the only road from Poshan to Laiwu. At 10 o'clock in the morning, the enemy 77th Division moving south from Poshan completely entered our ambush. As soon as the order for attack was issued, the various assault units, with the speed of lightning, charged toward the enemy troops, which were caught by surprise and completely wiped out in one day. In this battle, we concentrated a numerically superior force that outnumbered the enemy five to one, adopted encircling tactics, and attacked the enemy while he was on the run. We achieved total annihilation of the enemy forces and brought the battle to a quick and decisive end. We won the first round.

On the night of February 20, our main force also launched an attack against the enemy on the entire front. Fighting through the night, the First Column captured the western part of Laiwu city and all the strategic points in its northern suburbs. The 10th Column captured Chinyangkuan and wiped out most of the enemy forces holding the strategic points in its vicinity. The 6th Column made a thrust into the enemy's rear and bore down on Tussukou where the enemy's supplies were stored. Fighting through the night, it wiped out an entire Chiang regiment outside Tussukou. As we encircled Tussukou, we closed the only escape hatch of Li Hsien-chou's army group.

On the morning of February 22, the enemy's 46th Army withdrew into Laiwu city, where the 73rd Army was stationed. At this point, we gathered that the two enemy armies had two alternatives to choose from: to defend the city or break out to the north. Therefore, the decision was made to have the 1st, 2nd and 7th Columns form an assault corps from the west; to have the 4th and 8th Columns form an assault corps from the east; and to have the 6th Column attack the enemy at Tussukou and stop the enemy from escaping to the north. If the enemy should decide to defend Laiwu, a general attack was to be launched on the enemy from both the east and the west on the night of the 23rd. If the enemy should decide to break out toward the north, he was to be annihilated in the area between Laiwu city and Tussukou. However, following Chairman Mao's instructions "attack the enemy when he is on the move" and "try to wipe out the enemy forces when they are on the move," we first tried to get the enemy troops to leave the city and then to wipe them out when they were on the move. An enemy on the move was away from his battle position and could not fall back on his fortifications. He could not make full use of his superior technical equipment. Furthermore, an enemy on the run was bound to have low morale and no will to fight. He would be easy to wipe out. Getting the enemy to come out of the city would give us another advantage. Our troops, good at close-quarter combat and night fighting, could quickly wipe out the enemy in field combat. With this in mind, we increased our pressure on the city on the one hand to

pose a greater threat to the defending enemy. On the other hand, we left an opening in the north for Li Hsien-chou, hoping to induce the enemy to break out in the direction of Tussukou, thus to maneuver him into our prearranged battleground outside the city.

While the two armies of Li Hsien-chou's group were holed up in Laiwu city, Wang Yao-wu, afraid that Tsinan and the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway would be in jeopardy if Li's group were annihilated, ordered Li Hsien-chou to quickly lead his men to break out northward. On the morning of February 23, Li, putting his headquarters men and all army vehicles in the middle, the 73rd Army on the left flank, and the 46th Army on the right flank, led them to break out toward the north of Laiwu. We made no attempt to hinder their movement. We held our fire until the rear elements of his troops left the fortified positions in Laiwu and Kuangshan and entered our prearranged battleground. At about 10 a.m., the enemy's advance elements met and were fiercely attacked by our frontal attack units south of Tussukou. At noon, the enemy's rear elements cleared out of Laiwu. Our eastern and western assault corps immediately sent out detachments to quickly capture Laiwu and Kuangshan, thus enveloping the enemy. Now the 50,000 to 60,000 men of Li Hsien-chou's group were locked in a narrow strip measuring 8 li from east to west and 15 li from north to south, covering Peipu, Ch'inchuang and Kaochiawa. All exits were blocked. Under these conditions, our army launched a general attack against the enemy at 1:00 p.m. Our troops pouring in from all directions, with the momentum of an avalanche and the force of a thunderbolt, fiercely thrust into the enemy's positions and divided them up, and rapidly penetrated the enemy troops in depth and dismembered the besieged enemy. All of a sudden, the Chiang troops were cut into pieces. At one corner of the battlefield, our fierce gunfire overwhelmed the enemy fire, silencing many enemy cannon. Several motor vehicles of the Chiang troops traveling in the van caught fire when hit by our fire, and soon the motor vehicles, gun carriages and jeeps following behind were blocked on the highway. The Chiang troops pushed, jostled, and trampled on one another. They had cannon and guns, but they could not use them; they could only receive attacks without any rebuttal. At another corner of the battlefield, more than ten thousand Chiang troops were being pursued by our troops on a large tract of sandy beaches. On this wild field, where there was no place to hide, they rushed here and there like wounded wolves. When our troops approached them, they looked like ostriches, hiding their heads under the motor vehicles but exposing their buttocks. Some kneeled down with their guns raised overhead, crying "spare me!" The whole battlefield was resounding with shouts "surrender your guns or you will be killed!" All the enemy troops who had not been killed on the battlefield became our prisoners. This encirclement and annihilation battle lasted only four hours and ended in triumph at 5:00 p.m. When the moon was rising in the east, no gunfire was heard on the battlefield. Only groups of prisoners and heaps of guns, cannon, tanks and motor vehicles were seen in the dusk.....

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In the Laiwu campaign, our troops wiped out a pacification command of regular enemy troops, two army headquarters, and seven divisions, totalling more than 56,000 men in a span of three days and nights. If the number of enemy annihilated by our interdiction units and local armed forces was counted, the total would be more than 70,000 men. Eighteen Chiang army generals from Li Hsien-chou on down were captured alive. With this victory we smashed the enemy's plan for a pincer movement from the north and the south, and forced the enemies in Shantung to stay there for more than a month. Our army reinforced itself and increased its fighting strength with the large numbers of personnel and equipment captured on the battlefield. It controlled the western section of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway as well as the vast areas north and south of it, thus again linking the three liberated areas of Luchung, Chiaotung and Pohai and consolidating the rear base of our army. The Laiwu campaign frustrated Chiang Kai-shek's all-out attack against the liberated areas in Shantung, thereby laying a solid foundation for our later successes in smashing Chiang Kai-shek's concentrated attacks.

The victory of the Laiwu campaign was a great victory of Chairman Mao's proletarian military thinking and his military line. In this campaign, our army resolutely carried out Chairman Mao's strategic policy of active defense and the various rules of war including concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemies one by one in mobile operations. This was the basic reason for our victory. Before the campaign began, according to the general rules of war, the enemy had judged that our army would hold on to Lin-i and, therefore, amassed heavy troops there in an attempt to induce us to fight a decisive battle with him. However, our army resolutely gave up Lin-i and moved north, giving the heavy enemy troops no chance to use their might and thus maintaining our initiative. In addition, on our way northward to annihilate the enemy troops, under complicated and changing conditions, we patiently concentrated our maximum forces and caused the enemy to make mistakes in command. We grasped his weak points, encircled him at times and places favorable to us, penetrating his forces in various ways, wiping them out one by one, and winning the brilliant victory. At present, when the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius is developing in a thorough, widespread and sustained way, we must seriously study Chairman Mao's military writings and our Party's experience in leading the revolutionary war, fully understand and master Chairman Mao's military thinking, roundly criticize Lin Piao's bourgeois military line, and carry the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius through to the end.

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Singing the Praises of the Victory of Chairman Mao's Proletarian Military Line

- Model revolutionary theatrical works as a sharp weapon to criticize Lin Piao's bourgeois military line

by

Fan Chung-liu (范中柳)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 20, 1974)

Model revolutionary theatrical works born in the fierce struggles between the two classes and the two lines penetratingly reflect the Chinese people's fighting course of toppling the old world and ushering in a new one under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. They present a magnificent historical scroll chronicling the advance of the Chinese revolution from victory to victory over the past half century.

During the entire historical course of the new democratic revolution, the Chinese revolution was mainly characterized by armed struggle. Chairman Mao has said, "The history of our Party may be said to be the history of armed struggles." Building the Party's political line has been closely linked with the question of armed struggle. In depicting the armed struggles of the Chinese revolution during different historical periods and at different stages of development, model revolutionary stage productions not only ardently sing the praises of the great victory of Chairman Mao's proletarian military thinking and military line but also serve as a sharp weapon for us to incisively repudiate Lin Piao's bourgeois military line.

Our Principle Is Party Commands the Gun

Whether the Party commands the gun or the gun commands the Party has always been a paramount issue in the two-line struggle within the Party. Since the army was established struggle in this respect has never ceased. Model revolutionary theatrical works clearly embody a Marxist truth: "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun and under no circumstances should the gun be permitted to command the Party." On the stage the army is placed under the Party's absolute leadership and carries out the Party's line and policies, whether it be the Worker-Peasant Red Army during the period of agrarian reform or the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army during the Sino-Japanese War, or the People's Liberation Army in the war of liberation. "Our contingent is led by Chairman Mao and the Communist Party." These words, taken from "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy," succinctly and in clear-cut terms characterize the people's army and bring out the source of its power for defeating the enemy.

The commanders and fighters of the people's army identified in the revolutionary stage productions as heroes have set for us a brilliant example of consciously obeying the Party's leadership. In the face of difficulties

and obstacles during the embattled years, they first thought of the Party's cause and the Party's instructions they could draw upon so they could have the strength to defeat the enemy. "A red star on the cap is flanked by red banners of the revolution." The shining red star on the army cap symbolizing the Party's leadership illuminates the march of the people's army to battle. Yang Tzu-jung, a heroic scouting platoon leader, always takes "Communists constantly heed the Party's calls" as his own oath. Confidently he believes that "the Party gives me wisdom and courage and reduces any difficulty into trifling things" and "every word from the Party assures victory." He never cares about personal safety, his gain or loss, but attributes every achievement to the Party. Kuo Chien-kuang, a young company instructor of the New Fourth Army, and another comrade-in-arms continue to stand up like a sturdy pine although they are wounded and separated from the contingent. What force has inspired them? Kuo Chien-kuang's reply is clear-cut: "Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee indicate the direction and inspire us to fight vigorously in the flooded villages." When the situation becomes perilous, he closely relies on the local Party organization and encourages the fighters to "examine the whole situation, probe the enemy situation, hold on and wait for orders, and hold the gun firmly in hand." Among the heroes like K'o Hsiang, Hung Ch'ang-ch'ing, Chao Yung-kang and Ta Ch'un, there is the red thread of submitting to the Party leadership and regarding the Party's interests as rising above everything else.

Consciously obeying the Party leadership is determined by our army's class character. According to the Marxist point of view, the army is a product of class struggle. Since classes came into being we have the state and the army, a major component of the political structure of a state. In class society any army belongs to a particular class and serves the interests of that class. Our army is the army of the proletariat, a tool whereby the proletariat and the working people seize political power and consolidate it. As the vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party is a proletarian organization of the highest form. The Party's program, its line and policies embody in a concentrated form the fundamental interests of the proletariat and vast numbers of the toiling people. Therefore, the army of the proletariat must be placed under the Party's absolute leadership. The relations between the Party and the army can only be that between the leader and the led, meaning that the two are not parallel and their positions in no way can be reversed. Firmly establishing the concept of Party leadership demonstrates the high degree of political awareness of our army's commanders and fighters.

This awareness will of course not come into being spontaneously; it depends upon prolonged political and ideological education and on combating various non-proletarian ideas. In "The Red Detachment of Women" Hung Ch'ang-ch'ing asks Wu Ch'ing-hua this question: "Carrying guns and fighting for whom?" This question is of prime importance. Wu Ch'ing-hua, a woman slave burning with class hatred, had not correctly comprehended this important question when she first joined the revolutionary contingent. Not until Party representative Hung Ch'ang-ch'ing has educated her with the Party program and line and enlightened her with patience does she realize

the truth that "only after all of mankind has been emancipated can the proletariat itself be finally liberated." Carrying the gun signals the beginning of taking the road of revolution. And only under the direction of the Party's correct line can the gun win victories in the revolution. Hung Ch'ang-ch'ing put it well: "Making revolution depends not only on valor but also on a correct line!" What is the most fundamental in Party leadership is the exercise of leadership in ideology and the political line. In the initial stages of building our army, Chairman Mao pointed out: "After undergoing political education, the rank and file of the Red Army acquired class consciousness....and they realized they were fighting for themselves and the worker and peasant class." The process of Wu Ch'ing-hua's maturing from a woman of deep grievances and untold sufferings to a fine Communist fighter exemplifies the course of tens of thousands of revolutionary fighters of turning, under Party education, their simple class feelings into political consciousness. Our army is invincible precisely because they understand "carrying the gun and fighting for whom."

"Communism means truth and the Party is the one which leads the way." These words embody deep class feelings and incorporate penetrating historical lessons. Despite the innumerable uprisings unremittingly carried on by the oppressed slaves and peasants in Chinese history to resist the rule of slave-owning nobles and the landlord class, why did they all finally end in failure? In the last analysis it is because at the time there were no new productive forces and relations of production, no proletarian political party leadership, nobody to lead the way. In "Azalea Mountain," why was the peasant armed force rallied by Lei Kang able to avoid repeating the same historical mistakes? The basic reason is that K'o Hsiang exemplifies Communist Party leadership and his implementation of Chairman Mao's army-building line. This peasant force emerged triumphant from three reverses during which "the banner of revolt was raised three times," eloquently illustrating that a revolutionary army's triumph or defeat, survival or extinction, is completely dependent upon Party leadership and the line it espouses. With a correct line it can turn defeat into victory, danger into safety. With an incorrect line, even the gun can be abandoned.

The Party in command of the gun distinguishes a proletarian army from the armies of the exploiting classes and all other forces. In order to suppress the people's resistance all reactionary ruling classes in history had the army in their grip. The "maxim" of Hu Chuan-kuei, traitor and bandit commander in "Shachiapang" is: "He who has the gun is the king." He regards the gun as the capital for betraying his country, capitulating to the enemy, fleecing the people and running roughshod. All reactionaries follow this philosophy and Lin Piao was no exception. He trumpeted the fallacy of placing the gun in command of the Party and advocated a bourgeois military line for the purpose of usurping the supreme power of the Party, the state and the army and setting up the Lin family fascist dynasty and becoming a puppet emperor under the wings of Soviet revisionism. However, it is easier to remove a mountain than shaking the people's army. The vast numbers of our army's commanders and fighters are loyal to

the Party and to the people as they are determined to implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. When Wen Chi-chiu, a traitor hidden in the revolutionary contingent operating in Azalea Mountain in those years, rose to oppose the Party leadership, he was resisted by all the fighters. And when he conspired to lure the force to go over to the side of bandit Liu Erh-pao, Li Shih-chien replied categorically: "The army is led by the Party and you have no right to make transfers." Lin Piao had vainly tried to "direct everything and mobilize everything" only to find himself powerless to do anything at all about the direction and movement of the armed forces. Any conspirator and careerist who sought to dispatch troops to realize counter-revolutionary schemes in contravention of the wishes of the vast numbers of commanders and fighters would end up by destroying himself!

The Masses Are the Real Impenetrable Wall of Iron

The proletarian army led by our Party fights for the interests of the broad masses of the people. The class character of our army requires that in any time and at any place it should trust the masses, rely on them and arouse them. The model revolutionary stage productions ardently eulogize the flesh-and-blood relationship between our army and the masses of the people and sing the praises of the great truth that the "real impenetrable wall of iron is the masses, the masses of the people in hundreds of millions that truly support the revolution."

One's attitude toward the masses of the people is a touchstone that distinguishes the Marxist from the opportunist. Proceeding from the idealist conception of history, Lin Piao had consistently belittled the revolutionary awareness of the vast numbers of the working people. In the third year of the war of liberation, he continued to talk rubbish about the people in the Northeast, saying with an ulterior motive that they had been "blinded by orthodox concepts," that "fighters born in the Northeast are afraid of leaving their homeland, for fear of covering a longer distance." He had also vainly tried to use this to resist the orders from the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao. The model revolutionary theatrical works refute these fallacies.

"Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy" depicts the struggles on the Northeast battlefield in the winter of 1946. The people there had just freed themselves from the rule of the Japanese bandits and collaborators before they were again trampled upon by the US-Chiang bandit gang and people like Vulture. Could they really place their hopes on and tolerate the so-called "direct line of succession," that is, the "virtuous government" of the Kuomintang reactionaries? Chang Pao's bitter and tearful denunciations and the bruises and scars on Li Yung-chi's body served as a forceful rebuttal to Lin Piao. They were anxiously hoping for emancipation from the reactionary rule. Both Chang Pao and Li Yung-chi were eagerly looking forward to seeing the "coming of their own contingent." With implacable class hatred for the Kuomintang reactionaries smoldering and building up in their hearts, they would burst with inexhaustible revolutionary fortitude once

they were inspired and led by the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army. In the cocoanut grove and Yangko Farm and at Shachiapang....all the oppressed people across the land had old scores to settle. Their class status and the deep sufferings they had gone through required that they would inevitably support the Chinese Communist Party and the people's army led by it. Lin Piao had never perceived the great strength hidden among the masses. This betrayed the hideous features of his Right opportunism.

Contrary to what Lin Piao had in mind, model revolutionary stage productions identify the heroes among our army as having flesh-and-blood ties with the broad masses. Following Chairman Mao's teaching that "the revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them," they breathe with them and share their fate. They do not simply fight for the sake of fighting in battles. Rather, they do so for the purpose of publicizing for the masses, organizing them and arming them and helping them fight battles to establish revolutionary political power. Wherever they go, they make a practice of arousing the masses there, organizing and arming them while taking the Party's line and policies to the masses. Moving episodes such as those in which Yang Tzu-jung "asks about bitterness deep in the mountains," the Chief of Staff "arouses the masses" at Kopik'ou, "army-civilian harmony of feelings" in Shachiapang, the stirring scene on the banks of the Wanchuan River showing "the army cherishing the people and the people supporting the army," Chao Yung-kang sleeping on a firewood and straw heap during the stormy night....incisively reveal how the common class interests and revolutionary ideals forge close ties between the revolutionary army and the masses of the people to erect a rock-solid great wall of iron and steel. The people's fighters cherish the people everywhere they are and constantly bear in mind the latter's interests. This exemplifies the true political colors of our army and the revolutionary awareness of the vast numbers of commanders and fighters.

The revolutionary wars carried on by us are wars of justice. Since these wars represent the people's interests and wishes, they have the support of the masses of the people. Chairman Mao has said, "This army is invincible if in the eyes of the people it is looked upon as their own army." Brimming with revolutionary sentiments, model revolutionary theatrical works depict the people's deep feelings for their own soldiers and their wholehearted support for their own army. In "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy" Chang Pao and her father provided Yang Tzu-jung with clues to a Contacts Map and paths to Tiger Mountain, while Li Yung-chi pledged to the Liberation Army his determination to kill the enemy and led militiamen to attack Tiger Mountain. In "Fighting on the Plain" Granny Chang disclosed to the people's soldiers how they had been held close to the hearts of the people. In the same opera Granny Chang revealed how the masses of the people braved volleys of gunfire and endured untold hardships in leading the way, passing on information, and delivering clothing and food for their own soldiers. In "Shachiapang" the villagers risked danger and hazards in assisting and covering the wounded of the New Fourth Army.... In the history of revolutionary wars,

the masses of the people gave their lives and wrote with blood innumerable accounts of army-civilian unity. In situations in which the enemy had numerical superiority, the assistance and support given by the people turned the tide in favor of our army, transforming it into a strong force where before it was weak. Accordingly, whenever the broad masses of the people are on our side we have the real superiority. Army-civilian identity embodies our precious revolutionary tradition and is an important guarantee for victory. Lin Piao pursued the bourgeois military line for no other purpose than undermining army-civilian unity, vainly trying to radically change our army's class character. Today, we should emulate the heroes depicted in model revolutionary stage productions, cherishing army-civilian unity like cherishing our eyes in order to completely smash Lin Piao's sinister conspiracy.

Guiding Wars with Materialist Theory and Dialectical Method

In guiding the protracted struggles of the Chinese revolution Chairman Mao remarkably applied the Marxist materialist theory and dialectical method to the issue of war, from the particular to the general and then from the general to the particular. He scientifically summed up the laws of wars, particularly the revolutionary wars in China, putting forward a series of tactics and strategy regarding these wars. In portraying armed struggles, model revolutionary stage productions correctly embody the tactical and strategic principles advanced by Chairman Mao. This is clearly in opposition to the so-called "six tactical principles" -- an idealist and mechanical hodgepodge -- dished up by Lin Piao.

Where do correct tactics and strategy come from? They come from objective practice. Chairman Mao has said, "The commander's correct planning is derived from correct determination, correct determination from correct judgment, and correct judgment from careful and necessary examination and pondering over the related materials that have been gathered and scrutinized." The commanders of our army, as depicted in model revolutionary theatrical works, are all based on this law of knowledge before battle plans are drawn up. In the scene "Drawing Up a Plan" in "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy," the Chief of Staff leads a detachment into the mountain without first subjectively conceiving a combat plan in his mind. Instead, he assigns Yang Tzu-jung to find out the enemy situation and consult the masses about his findings. After obtaining clues to the Contacts Map and questioning Luan P'ing and Howling Wolf, he has in his possession information about Vulture's Hundred Chicken Feast. Subsequently he studies the enemy's characteristics and the terrain of Tiger Mountain. Only after he has sized up the enemy and carefully analyzed and pondered the plan does he arrive at the conclusion of taking Tiger Mountain by strategy. This plan has been drawn up in accord with objective conditions and leads to subsequent spectacular and dramatic episodes.

War itself is vivid and ever changing. Chairman Mao has said, "Different war conditions determine different guiding rules of war, the difference in time, locality and nature." "There is no such thing as things that remain unchanged all the time." Armed struggles depicted in

model revolutionary stage productions are waged with flexibility and versatility on the basis of different periods and different localities. "Shachiapang" depicts the resist-Japan struggle in the regions south of the Yangtse River, with particular emphasis on full utilization of the topographical features of these areas and other favorable conditions for unfolding guerrilla warfare behind the enemy line. "Fighting on the Plain" portrays the strategic stage of stalemate during the resist-Japan period in North China. Chao Yung-kang studies the terrain of the area before mobilizing the masses to dig tunnels deep and repair those that are unusable. Being good at analyzing the ever changing enemy situation, he has the whole situation in mind and from beginning to end tries to link careful scouting with hard-headed pondering. At the crucial moment of taking the gun emplacement by strategy, he senses that the enemy has become suspicious from the way Hatoyama issues an "emergency order." He acts decisively, outwitting Hatoyama by acting at the right moment to blow up a train-load of arms and ammunition. Chao Yung-kang's use of subtle tactics and strategy scares the enemy out of his wits. His nickname "Shen Pa-lu" (神八路) means that he has demonstrated the incomparable power of Chairman Mao's tactical and strategic thinking.

Fighting on the battlefield is aimed at wiping out the enemy. By continuously destroying the enemy's viable strength and strengthening oneself, the victory of the revolution can only be won by gradually changing the enemy's numerical superiority over us. The core of the ten major military principles laid down by Chairman Mao involves concentrating superior forces to fight a battle of annihilation on the basis of people's war and by keeping away from the enemy's strong points and hitting at his weaknesses. This military thinking of Chairman Mao's is a concrete application of the method of materialist dialectics in military affairs, that is, despising the enemy strategically but not under-estimating him tactically. This concept from beginning to end pervades model revolutionary stage productions that depict armed struggles. Destroy Vulture, overthrow Southern Despot and bury Hatoyama, all these battles finally end in the coordination of the main forces with the local detachments and militia units in completely and thoroughly vanquishing the enemy.

Chairman Mao has said, "Tendencies toward idealist and mechanical theories in the issue of war are the source of all erroneous views on the theory of knowledge." Lin Piao's "tactical principles" completely run counter to the dialectical method regarding the development of war. Peddling this trash everywhere as if it were eternally unchanging dogma, he did so for the purpose of militarily opposing fighting a battle of annihilation and politically favoring Right capitulationism and Right conservatism in the conduct of military affairs. Our study of the model revolutionary theatrical productions enables us to comprehend more deeply Chairman Mao's military thinking and his military line through our perception of the vividly presented artistic images, and to carry on with more penetrating repudiation of Lin Piao's bourgeois military line!

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Army-Civilian Unity Fosters Deep and Enduring Feelings

- Impressions after watching modern revolutionary Peking opera "Hung Yün Kang" [Red Cloud Crag]*

by

Tu Hua-chang (杜华章)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an [Study and Criticism], No. 10, October 20, 1974)

In China's protracted people's revolutionary wars from Chingkang Mountain to the Yen River and from Changpei Mountain to regions north and south of the Yangtse River, the deep feelings that existed between the masses of the people and the people's army became crystallized in many touching poems. On the Peking opera stage we have now heard a song of triumph about army-civilian unity, that is, the modern revolutionary Peking opera "Hung Yün Kang."

As the curtain was raised we were immediately attracted by eight huge characters reading -- "The army and civilians are united to wipe out the Chiang bandits!" These words embody the theme of the opera. With overwhelming artistic force "Hung Yün Kang" incisively depicts the ties between the armymen and civilians and warmly praises their deep feelings for each other, the army cherishing the people and the people supporting the army. During the people's War of Liberation, instances in which the masses of the people rescued and took care of our wounded soldiers under the very nose of the enemy were too numerous to mention. These instances exemplified the class content of army-civilian relationship, ties meaning essentially class relations. The army serves as the primary instrument for one class to exercise dictatorship over another. In the old world dominated by the exploiting classes, reactionary troops invariably bullied the people. The latter in turn bitterly hated the soldiers. Only the revolutionary armed forces led by the Communist Party and Chairman Mao could radically change the class character of army-civilian relationship and for the first time established completely new army-civilian relations for the proletariat. The People's Liberation Army is the revolutionary contingent of the proletariat, the people's own armed force. Originating from the masses of the people, it has struck root among them. "Standing firmly with the Chinese people and wholeheartedly serving them is the sole purpose of this army." Here lies the class essence of the relations between the army and the people under the leadership of our Party. The reactionaries will never understand that despite their attempts to vilify

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* See also "The Affection between the Army and the People Is As Deep As the Sea"--on the modern revolutionary Peking opera "Hung Yün Kang," Hung-ch'i, No. 10, October 1, 1974, SPRCM No. 796, p. 60.

our Party and our people's army, the masses continue to turn to the Party and support and warmly cherish the People's Liberation Army. The reason is very simple. The people support us because we defend their interests. We fight "not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation." The people's army previously was made up of the workers and peasants in uniforms and therefore the masses cannot but look upon them as their own folks and persons dearest to them.

After seeing "Hung Yün Kang" we recalled to mind a story told by Lenin in former years. In the second year following the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin recounted to the students of a military training class something he had personally witnessed on board a train. A group of people was listening to an old woman, who was comparing old soldiers with revolutionary fighters. She said the former upheld the interests of the landlords and capitalists while the latter defended the interests of the poor. She remarked, "Before, a poor man would be given a brutal beating if he helped himself to a piece of firewood. But now if you come upon a soldier in the woods he may even help you carry the firewood." "People have nothing to fear about someone carrying the gun." This embodies the deep sentiments cherished by an ordinary workman after the October Revolution toward the revolutionary army founded by great Lenin.

In "Hung Yün Kang" there are two types of troops in sharp contrast. One of them is the Kuomintang bandit army which upholds the interests of the big landlords and big capitalists. As soon as this army is in the I-meng Mountain area, it is accompanied by a group of returning landlords who lose no time to frenziedly counter-attack the masses in revenge, burning, killing, robbing and plundering and doing every misdeed. One of these soldier-bandits cries, "The Central Army has come. Captain Tiao is here. Whoever formerly divided the rich families' possessions must now return them at once. Failing to do so means outright execution!"

In contrast with this "woe-begotten army," the People's Liberation Army led by the Communist Party safeguards the interests of the broad masses of the people. With the heavy burden of the revolution and hopes of the people on their shoulders, they have fought their way from the north to the south, shedding blood and giving their lives. This contrast is clear to the people inhabiting I-meng Mountain. They know very well for whom Platoon Leader Fang is wounded. "If the comrades had not fought so bravely, how could suffering people like me ever be emancipated?" This line from the aria sung by Aunty Ying speaks louder than words what was in the hearts of the villagers.

"Hung Yün Kang" depicts with pervasive revolutionary sentiments the ardent love of the masses for the people's army. Despite untold privations they themselves subsist on wild-grown vegetables yet they send over to the dear ones fried doughnuts and chicken soup. To rescue the wounded, they risk great danger and extreme hazards, with the result that Grandpa Chao heroically sacrifices his life under the enemy's butcher knife.

In the words of Aunty Ying, "They treat the beloved Liberation Army more affectionately than their own family members or their own lives." Her image embodies in a concentrated manner the class feelings that rise higher than the mountain and as unfathomable as the deep sea. In a brilliant way she exemplifies the people of the liberated areas.

In the scene "Treasuring the Army Shoes" we begin to feel deeply her fiery devotion to the Liberation Army. When the returning group enters the village, its members shout: "Whichever household keeps Palu's [Eighth Route Army's] things must surrender them and whoever resists will be summarily executed!" Aunty Ying keeps a pair of army shoes at her home, with the words "The army and the people unite to destroy the Chiang bandits" embroidered on them. Her hsuband suggests that the shoes be torn apart lest they should be found by the enemy. But she adamantly refuses to do so, saying: "Impossible!" This is because this pair of shoes signifies supporting the army and there are words embroidered on them. Although the shoes are trifling things they express class feelings that are heavier than Mount Tai. Ying does not understand his wife, the daughter of a poor peasant, and what she cherishes in her heart.

With hatred and love welling up in her heart,
She sews the army shoes by the flickering lamp light.
Deep lingers army-civilian feelings,
These shoes sewn with her cherished sentiments
can be neither cut nor torn apart!

The above aria, conceived by the playwright, permits the wife of Ying to recall her bitter family history with agitated feelings. She has personally experienced the truth that "without a people's army the people have nothing." "The moment the Eighth Route Army entered I-meng the mist and the gathering clouds were dispelled." This is because with the people's army and Party leadership, she, the daughter of a poor peasant who was forced to sell her to repay a debt, was able to struggle against and topple the landlords and all exploiters and oppressors alongside the vast numbers of workers and peasants, establishing their own political power and becoming masters of the house. She cannot but ardently cherish the Party and the people's army.

From "Treasuring the Army Shoes" to "Rescuing the Dear Ones," the development of the sequences of the opera conforms to logic. The deeply touching scenes that pervade the opera profoundly impress the spectators. With subtle delineations and an orderly sequence, the playwright depicts how in the course of rescuing the wounded and tending them Aunty Ying cherishes the people's army. In the continuity of progression showing her spotting a wounded soldier in the open field, her anxiety when she finds the soldier in a feverish condition and in short breath, her plight when she cannot find a single drop of drinking water to quench his thirst, and her hesitation and embarrassment about breast-feeding the unconscious soldier after overcoming a sense of shame. This rescue operation which accents the development of her feelings with proper sequence touches the right chord in the audience. This scene, which culminates in a series of related episodes

charged with all-encompassing emotions, establishes her towering image in the minds of the audience.

The breast-feeding scene is fraught with far-reaching significance. Hasn't the people's army been nurtured by the masses so it can mature? From the breast-feeding by the masses of the people comes the life and strength of the people's army. Without the support of the masses of the people, it would have been impossible to win the victories in the War of Liberation. All work undertaken by our Party and the army is inseparably related to the support of the masses of the people. Platoon Leader Fang deeply comprehends this point. He sings:

> What the fighters wear is sewn by the people,
> What they eat comes from the sweat and toil of the masses.
> The Liberation Army marches on from victory to victory,
> It cannot move very far without the support of the people.

This aria sung by Platoon Leader Fang echoes his personal feelings and attests to the whole history of the Chinese revolution. He is wounded and kept apart from the detachment, from the combat collective. Yet he is not alone, not having the slightest feeling that he has been left high and dry. Very soon he returns to his people, like a fish taking to water, beyond the reach of the enemy. Where the people are, there is a truly impenetrable wall of iron, an inexhaustible source of strength for overcoming the enemy. In the I-meng Mountain area, for example, despite the terror and frenzy of the Chiang bandit army and returning groups of landlords, the soldiers and the masses are as close together as the lips are to the mouth, in weal or woe. Even Cheng Ying-t'ien who was timid and afraid of causing trouble has come forward and plunged himself into the battle through the influence of his wife. This has thwarted the enemy's futile attempts to breach the impenetrable wall of iron put up by the masses of the people.

As the people's fighter, Platoon Leader Fang exemplifies in a brilliant way the embodiment of the fine style of work of our Party and our army. He tended cattle in his childhood but grew up to become a firm revolutionary fighter. He therefore cherishes the flesh-and-blood relationship between the people's army and the masses. He is deeply ingrained with the mass concept and has realized from his participation in actual revolutionary struggles that firmly keeping to army-civilian unity, cherishing the people, trusting the masses and relying on them constitutes an important aspect of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. This precious revolutionary tradition that has identified our Party and our army must not be abandoned at any time. Abandoning this tradition would mean turning against the people and betraying the revolution. Even when he is wounded and has to recuperate at the home of Aunty Ying, he always thinks of the bitterness of the masses and strives to abide by the three major rules of discipline and eight points for attention so as to

lighten the burden carried by the people. The noble revolutionary character of the people's fighters is nowhere better illustrated than in Scene Five about "the army and civilians depending on each other." In this moving episode Platoon Leader Fang declines to accept a bowl of chicken soup prepared by Aunty Ying on the ground that he has food left from a previous delivery. Actually this consists of nothing but wild-grown vegetables he himself has gathered in order to lighten the burden of the villagers that have been so close to him.

Chairman Mao has recalled an episode during the Liaohsi campaign in which none of the fighters helped himself to the abundance of apples in Chinchow. "On this question the fighters consider that not eating the people's apples is nobler than eating them. This consciousness embodies our sense of discipline as a result of our Party's leadership and education. Man should have some spirit and the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat is derived from here." Platoon Leader Fang symbolizes this consciousness and the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat. It is precisely this consciousness and revolutionary spirit which has tightly bonded the people's army and the masses into a source of great material force.

Army-civilian identity embraces one of the three basic principles formulated by Chairman Mao for the political work of our army. It is an important component part of Chairman Mao's proletarian military line. From the democratic revolution to socialist revolution, the revolutionary tradition of army-civilian unity has been carried forward without interruption. To restore capitalism and push the bourgeois military line, renegade Lin Piao had devised ways and means to undermine army-civilian unity. But this conspiracy naturally was unsuccessful. Under conditions of proletarian dictatorship today, we should all the more emulate Aunty Ying and Platoon Leader Fang and cherish army-civilian unity. As the cornerstone of proletarian dictatorship, the People's Liberation Army contributed enduring merits to the great proletarian cultural revolution, which has further cemented army-civilian unity and infused into army-civilian relationship a new revolutionary content of continuing the revolution under proletarian dictatorship. In studying "Hung Yün Kang" we should bear firmly in mind great leader Chairman Mao's instructions and further unite ourselves under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Let us struggle together to consolidate the victorious fruits of the great proletarian cultural revolution and win new and still greater victories in socialist revolution and construction!

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